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In 1968 a group of black homeowners formed the Contract Buyers
League to protest the high prices of homes sold on land installment
contract in Chicago. While land contracts are used extensively by con-
sumers with little money for down payments on homes and were utilized
to exploit low- income and black consumers in many large cities, home-
owners in Chicago were first to protest the misuse of this financing
mechanism. In several protests including talks with contract sellers,
pickets of realtors' offices, payment strikes by purchasers, and lawsuits
against financial institutions and realtors, the Contract Buyers League
attempted to renegotiate contracts for black buyers.
Although no more nefarious than a traditional mortgage, land
installment contracts were used in Chicago to exploit black and low- income
purchasers. The small down payment and low monthly installments re-
quired by a land contract allowed the low- income consumer to become a
homeowner, yet the contract terms gave sellers excessive control over
the property. Until the last payment was made the buyer possessed no
deed to the dwelling and had no control over it. Frequently the contract
buyer also paid a sales price far above the fair market value of his home.
With few choices of dwellings and bad credit ratings these consumers were
forced to accept the contract sellers' demands or forgo home ownership.
The Contract Buyers League was formed to destroy this system
of exploitation in which inequitable terms, inflated sales prices and excess
profits were made possible by a limited supply of housing and credit. Its
development and activities affected the lives and economic security of many
buyers whose contracts were renegotiated. But more importantly, this
group initiated a complete reevaluation of the low-income black consumer's
role in the housing market. To the judiciary this organization posed the
question of whether or not a businessman should be allowed to extort large
profits from a group economically disadvantaged because of racial discrim-
ination; and asked if the legal system should intervene to correct inequities
in the housing market.
Without eliminating the only access to home ownership, black
contract buyers sought to rescind or reform existing contracts so they
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paid a reasonable price for housing, and to change the relationship
of buyers and sellers so future contract buyers would be protected
against the unjust provisions of land contracts. In this paper I discuss
the emergence and development of the Contract Buyers League as it
attempted to gain power for a group of housing consumers. Why realtors
were able to misuse land contracts for so long, how contract buyers were
oppressed by contract terms, and how realtors, financial institutions
and the judiciary reacted to buyers' efforts to change this real estate
practice is the subject of this analysis.
Thesis Supervisor : Robert M. Fogelson
Title : Associate Professor of History and City Planning
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INTRODUCTION
In mid January of 1970 Cook County Sheriff Joseph Woods led a
force of nearly two hundred deputies and Chicago policemen in an
abortive attempt to evict Johnnie Moss and his family from their home
on Chicago's South Side. With lines of gas masked, truncheon-carrying
deputies Sheriff Woods cordoned off the property before Moss and his
wife returned home. Only their three foster children were in the house
when movers entered by picking a lock and piled all furniture into the
snow. Shortly after the sheriff and his men departed, leaving private
guards inside the house, Moss along with neighbors and friends surrounded
the house.and convinced the guards to leave. Within half an hour of
Sheriff Wood's departure the Moss family was again settled in its home.
This effort which cost tax-payers $25, 000 and tied up almost 200
men for several hours was only one of many attempts to evict 150 South
Side families from their homes. Why the Cook County law enforcement
agency resorted to such costly and potentially violent action and why black
residents so effectively resisted can be answered by analyzing the develop-
ment of the Contract Buyers League and its opposition to the misuse of
land installment contracts. This means of financing real estate is used
extensively by consumers with enough equity for only small down payments
or without the good credit ratings needed to obtain mortgages. Although
land contracts were for a long time the only way for Chicago's black con-
sumers to become homeowners, these contracts caused hardships for
buyers that eventually evoked their protest.
After years during which many realtors made large profits, blacks
in Chicago began to oppose the use of unfair terms and exorbitant prices
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common to most land installment contracts. Banding together to secure
a better bargaining position in the housing market, blacks formed the
Contract Buyers League to force contract sellers into renegotiating
contracts and providing more reasonable sales prices of housing. Thus
began a series of protests including talks with contract sellers, pickets
of realtors' offices, lawsuits against financial institutions and land
developers, and payment strikes by buyers. As a result of withholding
payments several families like the Mosses were evicted from homes on
which they had for many years diligently made payments. Even the loss
of homes did not decrease the enthusiasm of the League's members.
Determined to correct the inequities of the housing market that gave
complete protection to the contract seller at the expense of low-income
and black consumers, the contract buyers continued their efforts to
bring about change.
Although no more nefarious than a traditional mortgage, land
installment contracts were used in Chicago to exploit black and low-income
housing purchasers. The small down payment and low monthly install-
ments required by a land contract allowed the low-income consumer to
become a homeowner, yet the contract terms gave sellers excessive
control over the property. Until the last payment was made the buyer
possessed no deed to the dwelling and had to obtain the seller's permission
before making any changes affecting the property. Frequently the contract
buyers also paid a sales price far above the fair market value of his home.
Both inequitable terms and inflated sales prices were made possible by
the scarcity of housing and credit for low-income and black consumers.
With few choices of dwellings and bad credit ratings these consumers
were forced to accept the contract seller's demands or give up their
dreams of home ownership.
The Contract Buyers League was formed to destroy this system
of exploitation in which excess profits were made possible by a limited
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supply of housing and credit. Its development and activities affected the
lives and economic security of many buyers whose contracts were re-
negotiated. But more importantly, this group initiated a complete
reevaluation of the low-income black consumer's role in the housing
market. To the judiciary, this organization posed the question of whether
or not a businessman should be allowed to extort large profits from a
group economically disadvantaged because of racial discrimination.
Contract buyers demanded that financial institutions and realtors analyze
the real risk involved in selling to low-income or black consumers, and
change lending policies and contract terms to reflect the consumer's
actual ability to make payments.
Because most realtors were unwilling to change a real estate
practice that benefited them, the Contract Buyers League had to take its
appeal to the legal system. In court the buyers requested a change of
laws so low-income consumers received protection like that available to
higher- income consumers. Although sometimes used by middle-and even
upper-income white classes, land installment contracts are most commonly
utilized by low-income people and all classes of blacks. Unlike the
traditional mortgage the land installment contract involves no financial
intermediary but is a two-party transaction between buyers and sellers.
The low-income consumer who uses this financing mechanism is not
protected by a financial institution that checks the terms and sales prices
of mortgage agreements to secure the loan it makes to a buyer. Instead
he deals directly with the contract seller who provides both housing and
the credit denied him by conventional lenders. Because land contracts do
not have inherent checks on sellers, the Contract Buyers League demanded
that statutory and common laws be instituted to protect the low- income
consumer. Where the housing market did not regulate itself with several
parties looking after their own interests, contract buyers desired inter-
vention by legislative and judicial action.
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Without eliminating the only access to home ownership, black
contract buyers sought to rescind or reform existing contracts so they
paid a reasonable price for housing, and to change the relationship of
buyers and sellers so future contract buyers would be protected against
the unjust provisions of earlier land contracts. In this paper I will
discuss the emergence and development of the Contract Buyers League
as it attempted to gain power for a group of housing consumers previously
discriminated against. Why realtors were able to misuse land contracts
for so long, how contract buyers were oppressed by contract terms, and
how realtors, financial institutions and the judiciary reacted to buyers'
efforts to change this real estate practice will be the subject of this
analysis.
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CHAPTER I
THE EMERGENCE OF
CHICAGO'S BLACK HOMEOWNER
A. The Dual Housing Market
Not until the 1950s did a significant number of black homeowners
live in Chicago. Although several migrations of blacks from the South
occurred between 1900 and 1970, blacks were confined to rental housing
mostly in the central city. Only gradually did blacks begin to rent and
then to purchase homes vacated by whites in neighborhoods surrounding
the central city. When home ownership for both blacks and whites in-
creased during the early 1950s. the causes that brought about this change
for the two groups were significantly different. On the one hand, the
Federal government guaranteed loans that allowed whites to purchase
their own homes in suburbia; while on the other hand, private real estate
speculators assumed the risks of selling to blacks in areas that whites
were rapidly leaving.
Because of conditions in Chicago's housing market, the risks to
speculators were usually more than adequately compensated by profits.
Not one homogenous market, but two housing submarkets existed. In the
black submarket demand for housing was much greater than the available
supply. Despite allegedly high risks, many speculators were attyacted to
this submarket where unsatisfied demand caused high prices yielding large
profits not obtainable for comparable housing in the white submarket.
This dual market system was created by a number of social and economic
conditions based on racial discrimination.
In analyzing the functioning of housing markets, several studies
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11)have concentrated on Chicago's market. ' Most of these studies have
given lengthy consideration to the problem of racial discrimination in
housing, yet the monetary cost of this discrimination to blacks is disputed.
Only the most obvious form of housing discrimination -- that in which
blacks are excluded from housing opportunities in certain locations -- is
usually acknowledged. Price discrimination, such as the disparity
between the quality of housing blacks and whites receive for equal expen-
ditures, is often explained away as the result of differences in housing
types consumed by the two groups.
Clearly shown in most studies of Chicago's housing market are
the effects of racial discrimination on residential location. As in most
American cities, blacks in Chicago were intensely segregated within
central cities. In one study Alma and Karl Taeuber calculate the degree
of this racial segregation as a segregation index using census block
statistics. This index, which assumes values from zero to 100, measures
the extent to which observed racial patterns of residence by block differ
from a theoretical pattern of proportional representation. A value of
zero indicates that the proportion of blacks on every block is equal to the
proportion of blacks in the entire city; while a value of 100 signifies total
(2)
segregation. According to the study's findings, between 1940 and
1970 Chicago's segregation index was above 92 showing nearly complete
separation of black and white residences. After declining during the 1940s
segregation increased slightly in Chicago during the 1950s. a time when
blacks and whites became homeowners. (3)
Residential segregation existed despite large increases in Chicago's
black population, for as blacks entered the central city whites sought refuge
in the suburbs. During this time the total population of the central city
declined while the black population steadily increased. For example,
blacks in the central city numbered approximately 280, 000 in 1940,
470, 000 by 1960, and 1, 100, 000 by 1970. In contrast, the white population
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declined from about 3, 100, 000 in 1940 to 2, 700, 000 in 1960, and 2, 300, 000
in 1970. (4) While the central city's white population declined, the
number of suburban whites increased. The communities surrounding the
central city developed as retreats for white inhabitants, where only a token
number of blacks were able to settle.
As blacks moved to Chicago they could not disperse among other
groups in the area. Several rationalizations for this seperation have been
made. The most common of these is the hypothesis that social needs of
the black population influenced the choice of location. Like other urban
ethnic enclaves, black neighborhoods were considered to be voluntary
concentrations of people with cultural similarities.
Although first postulated by whites justifying the residential dis-
tribution of racial groups within urban areas, during the last decade this
theory has received increasing approval by blacks who wish to strengthen
the socioeconomic and political power bases of black people. Separation
of voluntary self- segregation from that imposed by whites is, however,
virtually impossible as long as indirect forms of intimidation and dis-
couragement affect blacks' locational decisions. Some data and theories
of urban development suggest that restrictions on locational choice were
stronger than the natural affinities and recently strengthened cultural
f5)
awareness that encouraged separation. - While self-segregation has
certainly affected blacks' residential location, it is not the sole explanation
of segregation in Chicago.
Another explanation of segregation is that socioeconomic charac-
teristics of blacks prohibit integration. Several studies that evaluated
empirical data on which this hypothesis is based have concluded that it
(6)has little validity. ~ Using statistics from Chicago and Detroit, Anthony
Pascal studied the effects of socioeconomic characteristics on residential
segregation and observed that white/nonwhite differentials in income,
wealth, family size and composition, and job location of working members
account for only a small part of racial separation.
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Theories of urban growth support Pascal's findings. If socio-
economic characteristics such as low income force families to locate in
central cities, low-income whites as well as blacks should be concentrated
there. Similarly, middle- and upper- income black families should be
dispersed throughout the metropolitan area. Yet, this is clearly not the
case in Chicago. Instead in 1967 only 7. 7 percent of all black families in
the Chicago area lived in the suburbs, while 47. 6 percent of all white
families in the area lived there. Income does not explain the small
number of blacks in the suburbs; for only nine percent of all high income
(income above $10, 000 per year) black families lived in the suburbs,
while 54. 7 percent of all high income white families and 37. 2 percent of
all low income (below 3, 000 per year) white families lived there. (8)
These findings contradict economic theories of residential location unless
factors other than income confine blacks to central cities. Theories of
urban growth hold that as distance from the urban core increases, popula-
tion density decreases, land rent decreases, and travel costs to the core
increase. Stated another way, access to jobs and activities in the core
becomes more expensive, while consumption of space becomes less
expensive. High income households have generally located in suburban
areas because residential space consumption is more important to them
(9)than minimization of travel costs. Since it has never been shown that
black families have higher priorities for minimization of travel costs and
lower priorities for consumption of residential space than their white
counterparts, economic characteristics do not explain the small number
of blacks living in low density residential areas.
Social and political attitudes did not alone cause racial segregation,
for economic discrimination had an important effect on residential location.
The restrictive covenants of deeds, the regulations of local public officials,
and the actions of private real estate agents have historically separated
blacks from whites in Chicago; but equally as important, price discrimina-
tion in the housing market discouraged integration. This latter constraint
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is more difficult to prove than social and legal restrictions on geographic
location. Several studies have attempted to examine empirical data on
the cost, quantity and quality of housing for blacks and whites in Chicago
yet, none have been able to standardize housing services well enough to
show conclusively that observed price differences are not merely caused
(10)by differences in the types of housing consumed by the two races. '
In his study of single family dwellings on Chicago's South Side,
Martin Bailey asserts that blacks do not pay more for homes of comparable
quality and quantity than do whites in areas of similar residential density.
According to Bailey, values are higher in black neighborhoods only when
(11)
high densities of occupancy cause housing prices to rise. - The results
of this study are upheld by Richard Muth's analysis of the South Side
which attributes differences in prices for blacks and whites to differences
(12)in types of housing consumed.
Other studies contradict those of Bailey and Muth. A study of
economic discrimination by Gary Becker, for instance, acknowledges
differences in prices of housing for blacks and whites. In 1957 Becker
stated that blacks appeared to pay more than whites for equivalent housing
in Chicago. Yet, he believed that this was a temporary situation caused
by the large in-migration of blacks during the early 1950s and would be
eliminated a few years after the influx ceased. (13)Differences in price
were shown to be a long-term problem by a later study, which shows that
they also existed in 1940 following a decade of relatively little in-migration
of blacks. (14) Although conclusive proof of price discrimination has not
been compiled, these and other studies have collected data and developed
cogent arguments showing that blacks must pay a discrimination cost or
(15)
premium in addition to the white submarket price of housing.
Even if price discrimination is ignored, racial discrimination in
Chicago's housing market is a real problem. Both rental and privately
owned housing in Chicago had long been artificially in short supply for
blacks, because they were constrained by institutionalized restrictions
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and ostracism. As blacks moved into Chicago, they were not allowed to
locate far from the ghetto. Only slowly as whites fled the impinging black
neighborhoods were dwellings supplied to this enlarging sector of the
population. The units added were almost exclusively located where the
edges of black and white neighborhoods met.
The black submarket's housing supply gradually increased in the
central city as units filtered down from the white submarket. At the same
time the white submarket's supply was expanded not only in the suburbs,
but also, within the city. Although the central city's white population was
declining while its black population increased, whites received relatively
and absolutely greater supply of new housing. For example, in 1960 only
about 17, 000 black families occupied new housing (i. e. housing less than
ten years old) including public housing; while approximately 100, 000
white families lived in new housing that was mostly privately owned. (16)
Neither socioeconomic characteristics, nor self-segregation nor
inefficient housing production explains the failure of Chicago's housing
market to adapt supply to black demand. The supply of housing for
blacks remained artificially constrained, because the dual housing market
was based on race not purchasing power. This situation belied the validity
of neoclassical economics' fundamental assertion that economic systems
tend to stabilize at an equilibrium where resources and rewards are
almost always rationally distributed. Only when outside forces intervened
was the black consumer's welfare protected; and then only after sellers
had thoroughly abused these artificial market conditions.
B. The Land Installment Contract
Into this unregulated market system was introduced land contract
sales. Black renters long established in Chicago as well as Southern
blacks newly arrived in the city answered newspaper advertisements for
homes sold with very low down payments. Previously limited to rental
housing, a large number of blacks were finally given an opportunity to
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own homes. The move to Chicago's West Side neighborhood of Lawndale
in the early 1950s was part of blacks' continuing effort to acquire quality
housing in uncrowded urban areas.
When blacks purchased Lawndale homes on contract, they utilized
a financing mechanism commonly employed by low-income consumers.
Land installment contracts (LIC) were not the products of devious realtors
out to exploit poor blacks in Chicago. This method of financing real
estate had long been used effectively, because it required buyers to have
little equity at the time of purchase. Although the small down payment
needed for LICs usually caused the period of repayment to be longer and
total interest payments to be higher than for mortgages, several character-
istics of these contracts made them less costly than mortgages in the
short run. The following are some of the transactional costs to the pur-
chaser usually eliminated by land installment contracts:
1. Mortgagee's Title Insurance -- In the installment land sale,
the contract vendor serves in place of the mortgagee as financer, and
needs not insure a lender that his title is of value.
2. Survey -- When mortgages are used both the mortgagee's
insurance company and the mortgagee make sure that neighboring land-
owners are not encroaching onto the purchased land. This is not, however,
a problem to the contract seller who serves as financer, since presumably
he is aware of what has been happening to the boundaries of his land. The
low-income purchaser does not often require a survey for he is unaware
of possible problems.
3. Recording Fee-- The clause in early LICs that prohibited their
recordation has been declared illegal, yet law does not require that they
be recorded, and usually they are not.
4. Escrow Fee - - Since the LIC is a one-step transaction requiring
no formal closing, no fee is paid to a title company for handling a closing.
5. Credit Report -- Because contract sellers usually deal with
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low-income consumers, they often assume that purchasers can not meet
normal credit qualifications, and therefore do not require a credit report.
6. Brokerage Fee -- This fee is paid to a mortgage company as
a bonus for lending money, or to a mortgage broker as a bonus for
locating a moneylender. Because the contract seller finances LICs, this
fee is not charged.
Similar costs are eliminated for the contract seller. These
reductions make installment land contracts attractive to both buyers and
sellers and increase the availability of credit to low-income buyers; yet
they result in the loss of some protection for the purchaser. As mentioned
above, no survey is made to insure that neighboring land owners are not
encroaching on the property. Similarly, no search is made to ascertain
that the seller owns clear title to the property. These and other checks
are usually required by experienced moneylenders to protect their invest-
ments, and consequently protect the middle- income borrower. For the
low-income consumer usually unaware of potential problems no checks
are made by a concerned third party; and the buyer usually relies on the
knowledge and integrity of the contract seller. On the other hand, the
seller's interests are carefully protected by the contract terms.
The terms of land installment contracts differ from those of
conventional mortgages, because they are designed for real estate trans-
actions in which the purchaser has little initial equity. The major
differences between the two financing instruments is that the buyer using
an installment contract does not receive a deed until he makes the final
payment on his home, but a deed is immediately transferred to the
purchaser using a mortgage.
Another important difference is the role of moneylenders. In a
deed-mortgage transaction the purchaser makes a substantial down pay-
ment and borrows the remainder needed to pay a seller the complete
purchase price. In exchange for the deed, the seller receives full payment
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and no longer has legal interests in the property. The transaction then
involves only the purchaser and a moneylender to whom he is liable for
the amount of the mortgage. After the deed is transferred to the buyer, he
signs a mortgage giving the moneylender a lien on the property, and a
promisory note insuring that he will repay all money borrowed plus
interest. The financial institution assumes long-term responsibility for
collecting the debt. In land installment contracts, however, no money-
lender is involved; and assuming that the seller does not assign the con-
tract to another party, all monthly installments during the 20 to 30 years
of repayment are made to the seller.
If at any time during the payment period the contract buyer misses
a payment, the seller may terminate the buyer's rights under the contract;
and the buyer becomes a tenant subject to summary eviction damages.
This may occur whether the buyer has paid one percent or 99 percent of
the total purchase cost. Under these provisions, the seller is protected
from the irresponsible buyer; but the honest consumer who temporarily
cannot make payments is at the mercy of the seller. Unlike the mortgage
foreclosure procedure, repossessions and evictions are all too quickly
and easily carried out.
In Chicago land installment contracts provided the buyer somewhat
more security than did land contracts used in some other areas of the
country, because buyers could, according to contract terms, obtain a
mortgage after paying 50 percent of the principle. For most blacks in
Chicago, this term was useless, since very little mortgage money was
available to them.
Under the terms of land installment contracts black consumers'
interests were not protected, however alternative means of financing
homes were available only to the white middle-class. During the 1950s
as homeownership in the Chicago area increased rapidly, blacks benefited
little from the housing stock's expansion. The Federal Housing Administra-
tion (FHA) and the Veterans Administration (VA) accelerated this activity
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by guaranteeing financial institutions that loans up to 97 percent of a
dwelling's value would be repaid by the government in case of the buyer's
default. Reduced down payments, lengthened periods of repayment,
and more abundant funds were the result when the government reduced the
risk of lending.
During this period of increased housing market activity middle-
class whites became homeowners, while the low-income consumer was
neglected. In an effort to limit losses on foreclosures FHA set minimum
credit standads for determining which buyers could afford to make pay-
ments. (18) Since most low-income consumers did not qualify under
these guidelines, they were not aided by FHA programs for homeowner-
ship. Of course, low-income housing consumers were not neglected
entirely, for several programs provided subsidies for rental housing.
Yet, ownership and rental subsidy programs separated the economic
classes into two district groups of which only middle to upper-income
people were encouraged to own homes.
Just as the low-income white consumer suffered under limited
availability of credit for homeownership, all classes of the black popula-
tion in Chicago encountered this problem. Middle- and upper- income
blacks as well as low-income blacks were excluded from the housing
market by conventional lenders, the FHA and VA. Chicago's black
neighborhoods received little or no mortgage funds until the mid- 196(b.
Most lenders justify this omission as good business practice, because
according to them, the areas were declining rapidly with falling housing
values and rising insurance and crime rates. Blacks were, however,
restricted to residence in these areas by all of the discriminatory factors
discussed earlier in this paper.
C. Black Home Ownership in Chicago
Realizing that opportunities were increasing for middle-class
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whites to purchase homes while unsatisfied black demand for home owner-
ship was rising, a few realtors on Chicago's West Side began to take
advantage of both situations by selling to blacks on contract in predomi-
nantly white areas. The appearance of black faces in the working class,
predominantly Jewish community of Lawndale caused rapidly lowered
housing values, as whites tried to escape the westward expansion of black
neighborhoods. White residents needed little stimulus from speculators
to vacate the area leaving the homes that could be quickly sold to blacks.
Although the housing supply for blacks was increased by this
activity, speculators did not necessarily have this objective in mind when
they sold homes to blacks on contract. The two and three flat dwellings
that composed most of the stock in this area were usually purchased at
low panic prices as whites fled, and sold at high prices yielding large
profits.
When the opportunity came to own a home by making a small down
payment and agreeing to monthly payments, blacks willingly accepted the
terms of land installment contracts as the only means of realizing their
aspirations for home ownership. Because mortgage funds were not
available for blacks, they were unable to purchase directly fmm the
Jewish owners at low prices, but had to accept the inflated prices and
unreasonable terms offered by contract sellers.
When purchases were made, most buyers did not understand the
terms of these contracts. Many of the black people who came to live on
the West Side had only a grade school education and very few had completed
more than high school. In order to improve their bargaining position,
many buyers consulted lawyers about the terms of agreements they were
accepting. These lawyers were usually concerned with the legality of the
contracts, however, and did not advise purchasers about the value of
housing in which they were investing. Many West Side home purchasers
entered perfectly legal contractual agreements for the purchase of dwelling
units with questionable values.
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Not until the late 1950s were contract sales of homes gradually
increased on Chicago's South Side; and only during the 1960s were a
large number of single family homes sold using this financing mechanism.
Before 1958 most homes were rented to blacks moving into the predomi-
nantly white neighborhood.
In 1957 a surge of building activity began when Universal Builders
started constructing single family homes in the area. These houses were
marketed for the middle-class black family that was achieving a social
and economic role of growing importance in Chicago's black community.
Along with skilled factory workers and clerical workers with steady
incomes, a large number of Chicago's black professionals settled here.
Most new construction in this South Side community of Englewood
was built by Universal Builders or one of its ten subsidiaries. Few other
land developers operated in this market. To both low- and middle-income
blacks, Universal Builders offered land installment contracts as the only
means of obtaining a home built by that company. Even when blacks had
enough cash for a substantial down payment, they could use only install-
ment contracts and not mortgages. (19)
Long run savings on the total purchase cost of homes had to be
sacrificed to the short run convenience of low down payments and
immediate occupancy; because the benefits of home ownership were
attractive and no alternative means of financing homes existed. From
this group of blacks who took advantage of existing opportunities emerged
experienced home owners. As renters most blacks were unprepared in
the fifties and early sixties to evaluate the worth of buildings, or to cal-
culate the costs of repairs and maintenance that had to be paid along with
monthly installments. By 1968, however, several years of experience
as owners had made blacks in Chicago more aware of the problems and
costs of ownership; and they began to realize the errors they had made
when purchasing homes on contract.
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CHAPTER II
ORIGIN OF THE CONTRACT BUYERS LEAGUE
A. Conditions Leading to Protest
The dual housing market functioned efficiently. During the 1950s
and 1960s realtors pushed mostly discarded homes into the hands of
waiting blacks while land developers stamped out grid- patterned environs
for new white suburbanites. But the black consumer benefited little from
the housing stock's expansion. Certainly a new class of land owning
blacks was created, yet its recently acquired real estate was poor quality
and over-priced. Blacks sought social and economic stability for their
families through home ownership, but this dream was not realized.
Instead, blacks sacrificed large portions of their incomes for housing
that soon failed to meet their needs.
By 1967 blacks were disillusioned with the homes and new oppor-
tunities for well-being that they had purchased. Chicago's West Side
community of Lawndale suffered most of the problems common to de-
clining urban areas. Where once had been a stable working-class neigh-
borhood was now deteriorating houses, uncleaned streets, over-grown
vacant lots, and abandoned stores. Owning a home in this area was no
longer an asset.
Housing in old declining neighborhoods did not alone fail to meet
expectations of black purchasers. New homes in stable neighborhoods
of the South Side were below the standards of quality which they had been
attributed. The sidewalks of doctors' homes peeled away from building
foundations; the walls of factory workers' urban cottages sagged under
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leaking roofs; and the dream homes advertised by Universal Builders
had flooded basements.
Although neighborhoods declined and new homes were poorly con-
structed, the black contract purchaser was trapped in the agreement which
he had made and toward fulfillment of which he devoted so much of his
(20)income. Both the size of his capital investment and the scarcity of
easily financed quality housing dictated that a black contract buyer remain
in areas like Lawndale where the housing stock and neighborhood was
rapidly deteriorating, or Englewood where new homes were poorly con-
structed.
While black home buyers paid high prices for low quality housing,
contract sellers made large profits. Chicago's real estate speculators
may be called beneficent for they allowed blacks to purchase housing
where social conventions previously forbade black residency. Willingly
these realtors accepted the onus of financial risk and society's disapproval,
when they purchased old homes from fleeing whites and sold to blacks.
Yet in return for taking risks and developing bad reputations, realtors
received large profits not obtainable in other sectors of the housing market.
Blacks were finally able to buy homes, but only from speculators taking
advantage of an artificially restricted market.
By the mid 1960s the cost of home ownership for blacks began to
affect the economic security of black families and the physical condition
of housing they purchased. Housing deterioration was not caused solely
by the use of land installment contracts; .but on Chicago's West Side this
form of financing contributed to the housing stock's decay. Because
monthly contract payments were so high, Lawndale's working class
families had little capital to expend on repair and maintenance. Occasion-
ally when repairs and maintenance were not handled and paid for directly
by the buyer, they were made by the seller and their costs were added to
the total purchase price of the house. Thus, the buyer's period of
indenture to the seller was extended because of additional principle and
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interest costs. Yet, these expenditures on repairs were usually insufficient
to arrest decline of the property. The old two and three flat dwellings
quickly became delapidated when maintenance was slightly lowered leaving
blacks with broken dreams for which they still had to pay.
Payments were high. For several reasons a home purchased in
Lawndale on contract was more costly than a home purchased on mortgage
in other areas of Chicago. The dual housing market existing in Chicago
forced blacks to pay a premium for housing in addition to the accepted
white submarket value. This premium commonly known as a race tax
has two components- (1) the difference between the black submarket price
and the depressed price at which speculators acquired the property from
frightened white sellers, and (2) the capitalized financing and holding cost
levied as high interest rates by the seller who provided the buyer with
long-term financing.
For the contract buyer in Lawndale this meant that the initial
sales price and total interest payments were higher than those for compar-
able housing in the white submarket. The latter problem did not result
because of high interest rates -- contract buyers usually paid no more
than 0. 5 percent above the existing market rate (21 - but because the
initial sales price was higher and the payment period longer than for
comparable housing financed with a mortgage. For instance, in 1960 a
real estate speculator purchased a residence from a white family for
$14, 000 and sold it three days later to a black couple for $25, 000. Only
a $2, 000 down payment was required of the white realtor, for he obtained
a mortgage for $12, 000 in this allegedly unsound area where mortgage
financing was refused to blacks. The black buyers soon decreased the
seller's equity investment by making a $1, 500 down payment and signing
a contract calling for monthly installments of $226. Under this contract
the couple was to have made total interest and principle payments of
$44, 820. If instead of this arrangement the buyers had purchased the
dwelling at its FHA appraised value of $15, 000 using a mortgage, they
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would have paid a total of only $20, 740; and their debt would have been
paid off within- a shorter period when using the same monthly installments
of $226. By ballooning the price, the seller was able to extort a difference
or race tax of $23, 980 over the years. (22)
While playing homeowner the contract buyer remained for most
purposes a renter. All of the incentives of home ownership encouraged
blacks to invest as much time and money into their property as limited
resources allowed, but too frequently only the contract seller benefited
from these expenditures. Other than a copy of the land installment
contract the buyer had no legal title to the house in which he lived, for the
seller retained the deed until the last payment was made. Some contracts
allowed the purchaser to obtain a mortgage and therefore a deed and legal
control of the property after fifty percent of the principle amount was
paid, but few sellers adhered to this provision. Instead, like a renter a
contract buyer had no control over the dwelling and could be evicted
through summary eviction procedures following the first failure to make
a payment. In the name of justice for the investor family after family
staked their savings in some homes only to be evicted like any renter,
when they could no longer make monthly payments.
The expense of occupying standard housing was increased for
blacks who became homeowners. The passive role of renter was replaced
by a new position of responsibility in which blacks had to make large
expenditures for property maintenance. Cash from black pockets replaced
that which otherwise would have come from white landlords protecting
their investments. Black owners could not casually accept housing as
something to be used and discarded in time, but had to expend time and
money on property maintenance. Even when the installment payments for
single-family homes or the payments minus rental income for multi-unit
dwellings were equal to normal rents in the area, the expense of repair
and maintenance increased owners' housing costs. As neighborhoods
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declined and building turnover increased, the rising cost of repairs and
maintenance made the goal of home ownership more difficult to attain.
During the 1950s speculators in Lawndale passed on to contract
buyers many responsibilities of controlling urban real estate, when land
installment contracts were used. These magical documents turned renters
who cared for housing only as temporary shelter into owners and landlords
concerned with its long-term value. Black homeowners selected tenants
for their two or three flat buildings, saw that repairs were made, collected
rents and maintainedthe dwellings with the enthusiasm of investors expecting
future returns. Yet, the possibility of gaining these profits declined with
the neighborhoods that suffered from over-crowding as the rapidly ex-
panding black population squeezed into a few units added to its housing
supply. Speculators were relieved of the need to supervise their property
in Lawndale while reaping returns on their investments. While working
as full-time property managers, janitors and maintenance men, contract
buyers paid monthly installments to the realtors they served. What matter
to sellers that blacks could not maintain the buildings properly because of
high monthly installment costs. The area's decline was imminent, but
not before many sellers recovered their small investments. Usually only
the buyer lost, for when he finally paid off his debt, he acquired a deed to
a devaluated property in a declining area.
B. Exploitation Discovered
Lawndale sellers secured their investments against the buyer's
default and neighborhood deterioration, but not against the changing
attitudes of blacks that occured there during the mid- sixties. Instrumental
in bringing about this change was John Redmond (Jack) Macnamara, at
that time a Jesuit priest studying at a seminary in Aurora, Illinois. In
1967 Macnamara began working with the Presentation Parish Church in
Lawndale. Throughout the history of Lawndale, this Catholic Church had
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remained as the area changed from Catholic to Jewish to black, and had
retained much of its influence in the community even though most blacks
were Baptist. With the encouragement of Father John Egan, then head
of the church, Macnamara became interested in the community's prob-
lems. After participating in several religious programs, Macnamara
decided to continue and extend his work in Lawndale. Under his direction
eleven white college students from across the country came to live in the
predominantly black community of Lawndale in the summer of 1967 and
formed the Presentation Church Community Organization Project.
From two apartments in Lawndale these students moved throughout
the community questioning residents and organizing programs to solve
some of Lawndale's problems. Beginning with efforts such as obtaining
children's play lots, Macnamara and his companions worked in the
community and established a degree of acceptance among the people. No
lack of issues thwarted this group's efforts, for the declining West Side
had many problems awaiting solution. Sporadic garbage collection,
dilapidated housing, abandoned buildings, over-crowding, unemployment,
and high crime rates were only a few of the problems affecting Lawndale.
What began as a summer project for twelve students continued throughout
the year and evolved into a movement for institutional change.
Only after organizing several projects to obtain better public
facilities did Macnamara and the other students discover the problem
that they believed to have contributed largely to Lawndale's decline. In
land installment contracts they identified a cause of undue social and
economic stress on black families and the community. Because the cost
of home ownership was so high when homes were purchased on contract,
black husbands worked two jobs, their wives were employed, and family
life was reduced to a minimum. According to Macnamara's observations,
there was little time left for blacks in Lawndale to form solid family
structures that allowed close supervision of children and organized
opposition to crime in the area. (23)
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The effect of housing on human life has frequently been studied
and often over-emphasized as the source of all urban problems. While
not the only detriment, the cost of purchasing homes did affect the lives
of blacks on Chicago's West Side and to some extent hasten the area's
physical decline. Even if land contracts caused decay in no other way,
they allowed high sales prices that diverted funds which could otherwise
have been used for repair, maintenance, and improvement.
As early as 1958 warnings were voiced concerning the potential
(24)deleterious effects of contract sales, yet they were not heeded; and
the extent to which land installment contracts were used in Chicago
remained unknown to contract buyers. Unfamiliar with legal forms and
uninformed by lawyers whom some consulted, black buyers usually be-
lieved that they had mortgages.
The frequent incidence of contract purchases was not acknowledged
and efficaciously opposed in Chicago until 1968, following Ruth Wells'
complaint to Father Egan of problems with her realtor. Realizing that
without a deed she had little control over her property, Ruth Wells and
her husband sought to obtain this document after the amount specified in
her contract, 50 percent of the principle, had been paid off qualifying them
for a mortgage and deed. Despite the endeavors of Mrs. Wells and her
lawyer, the contract seller could not be prevailed upon to give her a
mortgage. Citing the cost of repairs added to the sales price after the
agreement was closed and increasingly high insurance rates that were
deducted from monthly amortization payments, the seller insisted that
the required fifty percent of the principle had not been paid off as Mrs.
Wells had calculated.
When Mrs. Wells took the advice of Father Egan and brought her
problem to the attention of Jack Macnamara, events began that eventually
changed real estate practices in Chicago. Talks with Ruth Wells convinced
Macnamara that all blacks probably experienced difficulties when purchas-
ing real estate in Lawndale. During the seminarian's activities in
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Lawndale complaints were frequently made about the high "mortgage
payments" required when purchasing a home. Not mortgage payments
but land installment contract payments were soon found to be the cause of
these complaints. Because contract sellers retain deeds until final pay-
ments have been made, it was not difficult to determine the extent to
which contract sales were made in Lawndale. A search for titles in a
twelve block area disclosed that titles to more than half of the homes
were possessed not by black homeowners but by realtors who had complete
control of property being purchased on contract.
The slow process of informing and organizing the community began.
Within the twieve block study area the students, Ruth Wells, and eventually
other contract buyers went from house to house discussing the problem of
contract buying in Lawndale and enlisting support to force contract changes.
What was the problem that these people set out to solve and why did their
opposition to contract sales succeed when earlier attempts to change land
contracts had failed ? After all, this was not the first time contract
buyers had united to oppose unfair real estate practices connected with
land installment contracts.
In 1966 urban renewal's construction of a shopping center in one
section of Englewood raised the ire of displaced homeowners. The major
concern of the South Side homeowners was to stop urban renewal of their
neighborhood or to obtain payments for their property that reflected the
inflated sales prices they had paid. In seeking these objectives these
owners learned of problems connected with land installment contracts.
At that time owners of two, four and six-flat dwellings and some single-
family homes discovered the difference between white and black submarket
housing prices, and the inequitible distribution of power between white
deed-holding sellers and black contract purchasers.
In determining what prices should be paid for property to be
purchased by eminent domain, the City of Chicago did not consult contract
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purchasers but only realtors holding deeds. Usually the price decided
upon by these two parties was well below the sales price charged to black
buyers, but within the price range for comparable housing in the white
submarket. Contract buyers protested arguing that they had a right to
participate in determining the settlement price; but they were ignored.
The City of Chicago paid just enough for the housing to pay off the seller's
mortgage, but not enough to cover the land installment contract price.
For example, if a buyer had purchased a home on contract for $25, 000 and
had paid $17, 000 on the principle at the time of the urban renewal project
he only received $14, 000, the seller's acquisition price for the house,
when it was purchased by emminent domain. Sellers recovered their
investments, cancelled their mortgage debts and often made a profit, while
contract buyers lost their homes and retained an unpaid balance on the land
contracts. Pickets and attempts to pass state legislation protecting the
contract purchaser against public action failed at that time, and the South
Side buyers were scattered to make way for a shopping center.
Along with community organizations that tried and failed to change
contract sales in Chicago, public agencies attempted to bring the use of
land installment contracts to the public's attention only to elicit little or
(25)
no response. ' In 1962 the Chicago Commission on Human Relations
published a study that exposed the extensive use of land installment con-
tracts showing portions of black areas where only this financing mechanism
was used. (26) Yet, later studies of Chicago's housing market have
consistently failed to consider the importance of land installment contracts
in black areas and often equate this form of residential real estate financing
with the traditional mortgage. Though blacks responding to questionnaires
may frequently have stated that their homes were mortgaged, the relia-
bility of such data has been proven low by the Contract Buyers League's
experiences. Until CBL became active, most blacks were unaware that
they held installment contracts instead of mortgages.
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C. Social Change
Where earlier community organizations and public agencies had
failed, the Contract Buyers League succeeded, for its appeal touched the
public as well as contract purchasers. Unlike the South Side group that
organized to oppose one issue, the destruction of their homes by urban
renewal, CBL identified the cause of a multitude of problems that were
attracting public attention at that time. Not individual homeowners impeding
urban renewal's progress and community improvement, but the poor, the
black, the downtrodden consumer uniting against the landed establishment
led the Contract Buyers League to popularity.
The mid- 196 Os provided a salubrious environment for such
righteous revolt. This was the time for America to attack its domestic
problems; and the provocation for this action came from new power
groups composed of the oppressed. A number of movements were in full-
swing when the contract buyers posed their problem to the public. The
most significant change occuring at that time was the general politicization
of the poor. The " war on poverty" had long been a common phrase on the
American scene. The Office of Economic Opportunity made available new
job openings, while Community Development Corporations spread the idea
of neighborhoods instigating urban change. Yet, these governmentally
approved programs were not the only efforts to improve the situation of
the poor. On foot and behind horse carts poor people marched to
Washington, D. C. led by Martin Luther King's Southern Christian Leader-
ship Conference (SCLC) to obtain more rights for the poor; and welfare
mothers began picketing for larger child-care allowances.
In this politicization process the black poor had a major role.
Filling a large part of the low economic stratum especially in major
Northern cities, poor blacks experienced directly the deterioration of
urban ghettos as central cities continued their rapid decay. Trapped in
these areas with substandard housing, non-functioning public services, few
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job opportunities and little personal safety, they began the riots of Watts,
Newark, Detroit and other cities that shook America for several summers.
The destitute were not the only blacks who rebelled in their ghettos.
Families with stable incomes like Chicago's contract buyers also wanted
to destroy the inequities that locked them in declining neighborhoods and
denied them many opportunities available to whites. Revolt was accompan-
ied by growing racial consciousness and often militancy that changed the
black minority into a viable political force.
Chicago's black minority was particularly well established as a
politically expressive group. The Northern stronghold for the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference, Chicago had a long history of black
efforts to improve neighborhoods and extend housing opportunities. It was
here during the 1960s that Martin Luther King, Jr. led open housing
marches against strong efforts by segregationists. From both the South
and West Side communities came blacks to participate in these and other
efforts to improve their living conditions.
Many exploited groups expressed opposition in Chicago during the
1960s. Like tenants across the country, renters in Chicago began to
organize their strength. While most tenant organizations in other cities,
however, were formed by middle- and upper- income renters, those in
Chicago were more frequently formed by low-income, inner city groups.
Since the days of settlement houses and Jane Adams, Chicago's poor had
been familiar with the power of community organizations and had known
the successes of groups such as Back of the Yards and The Woodlawn
Organization led by Saul Alinsky.
During this time a resurgence of the movement for consumer
protection also occured. Organizations like Nader's Raiders tried to
protect the middle-class American against shoddy or dangerous merchan-
dise; and studies such as that by David Caplovitz pointed out that the
nation's poor were paying far more for goods and services than were
consumers with better credit ratings. Protests by several consumer
32
organizations led to attempts at passing Federal, state and local laws
protecting the consumer. In Illinois legislation dealing directly with the
use of land installment contracts had even been written as a result of
South Side homeowners' efforts in 1966, but it had not been passed. This
proposed legislation, known as the "Consumer Real Estate Protection
Act," stipulated terms to be included in land installment contracts to
decrease the buyer's obligations and give him more control of the property
without unduly risking the seller's investment. Society was beginning to
realize that in real estate as well as other markets, sellers had unfair
advantages in transactions especially with low- income consumers and
that regulation was required to direct this unbalanced system toward
equilibrium. No longer was caveat emptor the creed of the nation's
market system.
Within the nation there were increasingly popular attitudes con-
ducive to improving the situations of the poor, the black and the down-
trodden consumer, categories into which the contract buyers fit well.
That the Contract Buyers League was formed and well- supported is not,
however, a logical concomitant of these trends. Although national and
metropolitan political environments weaken or stimulate community action,
they alone do not determine success or failure of these efforts. Contract
buyers were aware of changing attitudes toward institutional racism and
consumer exploitation, but this awareness did not insure that
they would try to emmulate the successes of other movements. To
better determine the reasons for CBL's acceptance and growth at this
time, goals and activities of the organization must be considered given
the neighborhood context in which the organization developed.
D. Organizing the Contract Buyers
When organizing the contract buyers of Lawndale, the homeowners'
apathy had first to be overcome. Earlier efforts by the Presentation
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Church Community Organization Project had partially surmounted this
problem by eliciting participation in projects to obtain children's play
lots and to improve community services such as garbage collection.
These triumphs over City Hall gave credibility to the idea of community
organizations effecting change. To oppose the less impressive but stronger
foe of numerous small realtors required a greater effort by Lawndale
residents. Their goals had to be clearly defined, for this opponent was
not a public servant but a private agent, and was supported by the tradi-
tion of the free market system. In opposing contract sellers black buyers
attacked the exploitation of existing market conditions, and the concept of
good business practices that allowed economic discrimination.
The Contract Buyers League only gradually began to define its
goals. A detailed history of the League need not be presented here, for
other writers, notably James A. McPherson, have described its formation
and growth. (27) Important in determining reasons for CBL's success,
however, is an awareness of the organization's early difficulties in
attracting members.
To call the Lawndale residents first concerned with contract
buying an organization is to attribute formal structure and power the
small number of enthusiasts did not then have. What these five or six
buyers did have was a sense of injustice resulting from their experiences
with real estate purchases and a desire to improve their bargaining posi-
tion by uniting with other contract buyers. Supported by Macnamara and
the other students, they set out on a project indistinguishable from earlier
efforts by the Presentation Church Community Organization Project. Real
estate title searches had shown that most Lawndale purchasers were con-
tract buyers and did not possess deeds and mortgages for their homes; but
convincing these residents of this fact was very difficult. A sense of
pride, desire for privacy and fear of embarrassment prevented most
blacks from admitting to themselves or others that they had purchased
homes on land installment contract. These people who aspired to home
34
ownership did not want the stigma of helplessness and ignorance associated
with exploitation of the poor. In the neighborhood meetings attended by
Ruth Wells, her husband and one other contract buyer, and organized by
the students, Lawndale residents did not respond to charges against
realtors. Only gradually did buyers equate their high housing costs with
realtors' misuse of land installment contracts.
The process of organizing buyers was slowed by blacks' reluc-
tance to accept the aid of white students out to transform the ghetto. At
meetings held in the Presentation Parish Church or Macnamara's
apartment, few people wanted to expose their mistakes before the out-
siders who called them together and conducted the meetings. While
Lawndale residents had been willing to attack Chicago's neglect of their
neighborhood, they did not at first enthusiastically oppose the market
system which their lack of sophistication helped to perpetuate. Not
until Ruth Wells began to actively participate in the meetings did other
blacks acknowledge their familiarity with the problem, contemplate its
solution, and recruit friends and neighbors to join the fight.
Unknown to these neophytes was the time and effort this fight would
require. Still unresolved at the time of this study, the attempt to renego-
tiate land installment contracts continues in the Federal courts where
contract buyers finally took their demand for justice. Despite buyers'
reluctance to fight and sellers' prolonged resistance, the small number of
rebellious buyers eventually grew into a strong organization of about
five hundred buyers seeking the renegotiation of an estimated 3000 land
installment contracts in Lawndale. (28) It was this goal that gave CBL
much of its solidarity, for the savings obtained by reducing the sales
price of a house to the appraised value and refinancing with a mortgage
often amounted to several thousand dollars. As calculated by the League
the average savings per family because of contract renegotiations was
$14, 000. (29) Early during the organization's formation this monetary
objective was emphasized and became a strong incentive around which to
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mobilize support. While appealing to the public's conscience as poor
black consumers, the contract buyers sustained their own motivation with
the realistic goal of reduced housing costs.
In February of 1968 this group of concerned homeowners became
known as the Contract Buyers of Lawndale. The members set about
further structuring the organization. Leaders were chosen and the group
was formally distinguished from the Presentation Church Community
Organization Project, which retained a small student membership.
Charles Baker and Clyde Ross, both Lawndale contract buyers, were
named President and Vice-president respectively. This move further
strengthened the organization by providing the members with black
leaders who had experienced the same problem with realtors, and with
whom the homeowners could identify. Macnamara and his helpers did
not bow out of the movement at this time, but continued to participate in
decisions about policies and strategies for forcing renegotiations. Acti-
vities by the Presentation Church Community Organization Project were
soon suspended in favor of an all-out effort against contract sellers. The
following was stated in an essay by Macnamara:
Because the project workers wanted to emphasize
the necessity and importance of the residents
themselves assuming the responsibility for the
solution of problems.. they decided to retain
their own identity as the Presentation Church
Community Organization Project. In June 1968,
the members of the project decided to change
their name to the Gamaliel Foundation, as a
result of the inspiration received from the...
passage in the Acts of the Apostles.. . (30)
More than an afflatus, however, stimulated the formation of this
group. The Gamaliel Foundation with its non-profit, tax-exempt status
received all donations for support of the contract buyers' protests; and
later as two Federal court cases dragged on and enthusiasm among the
buyers diminshed, most activities against the contract sellers were
conducted by either lawyers or students working out of the Gamaliel
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Foundation's downtown Chicago office.
Once Macnamara and a few contract buyers established support in
Lawndale, contract buyers on Chicago's South Side were more easily
organized. Although geographically seperated and socially differentiated,
residents of the two black areas often worked for the same firms. An
established social attitude held by many black Chicagoans attributed to
South Side blacks a higher social and economic status than to blacks living
on the West Side. Yet, at work members of the two groups were brought
together as they performed the same tasks; and there the South Side
purchasers learned that they too were contract buyers. Like the West
Side purchasers, most South Side residents complained of high mortgage
payments and were convinced that their homes were financed using tradi-
tional mortgages. In talking with Clyde Ross, Vice-president of the
contract buyers' organization, several employees of Campbell Soup
Company learned the distinction between land installment contracts and
mortgages. At first one South Side buyer was unwilling to believe that
his new, custom-built home was still controlled by a realtor and volunteered
to show Ross his 'mortgage.' But, Ross finally proved to many of his
fellow workers that they were in the same position as West Side buyers.
Contract buyers like Ross and news accounts of early activities
in Lawndale informed many South Side buyers of the problem and convinced
them to join the West Side group. Because all homeowners in one section
of Englewood purchased from a single land development company,
Universal Builders, or its subsidiaries, it was less difficult to persuade
these buyers that they had land installment contracts than to convince
West Side buyers who purchased from over a hundred realtors.
With the added strength of many Englewood residents the home
owners formed the Contract Buyers League to protest the misuse of land
installment contracts. This organization had more than the immediate
goal of self-protection which motivated the group of South Side buyers
opposing urban renewal in 1966; the League also had an appeal that
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attracted public sympathy. With goals defined and supporters mobilized,
the Contract Buyers League set out to obtain recompense for inequities
in the housing market.
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CHAPTER III
CONTRACT SALES IN CHICAGO
A. The Contract Seller's Position
Soon after it was organized, the Contract Buyers League set out to
renegotiate land contracts by continuing talks begun by Ruth Wells and
Jack Macnamara with West Side sellers. According to one publication
by a group of West Side realtors, the League was the creation of outside
(31)
agitators upsetting otherwise content homeowners. An advertisement
in a Catholic newspaper by the Real Estate Investors Association com-
plained to the public that "the Contract Buyers association was organized,
instigated by the Presentation Catholic Church. . . It incited the contract
purchasers by telling them they had been 'exploited' -- that they had
overpaid for their property. " 32) Against what was considered ground-
less protest, the contract sellers reacted with impatient tolerance. In
talks with CBL's leaders and members, most realtors offered false
sympathy and palliatives along with concessions of small reductions in
sales prices and buyers' responsibilities.
Attempts to placate contract buyers were not long successful.
Realizing that only superficial reductions in housing costs would be ob-
tained by bargaining with contract sellers, CBL continued talks, but also
began the second phase of its protest. In the summer of 1968 even before
the membership was enlarged by South Side homeowners, buyers began
picketing realtors ' offices. To these routine Saturday pickets
sellers at first reacted with bravado, telephoning each other and joking
about the demonstrations outside their offices. This sense of humor
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soured when contract buyers began to picket realtors' homes, and dis-
appeared when one speculator thus pressured, repented his erring ways
and agreed to renegotiate about fifty contracts. Now the pickets that
provoked complaints from friends and neighbors irritated contract
sellers, as well as strengthened their resistance. By labelling as a foe
all contract sellers instead of the individual realtors confronted in
private talks, buyers inadvertently spawned what had facetiously been
called a 'contract sellers league' composed of realtors selling in Lawn-
dale who pooled money to oppose the contract buyers. No longer did the
realtors hesitate to become embroiled in the controversy. To these men
the League's efforts were a farcical attempt to destroy a valid business
procedure, and they were determined to resist.
What right had the contract buyers to demand reductions in the
sales prices of their homes, and failing in talks, to loiter around the
offices and homes of respected businessmen? After all, as Judge Sam
Perry, a Federal District Court judge, stated in a case brought to court
by a South Side contract buyer in 1972, some situations allow greater
profits than others. He stated:
The same economic forces and the law of supply
and demand create and destroy markets for building
boom towns in time of war and dying ghost towns
in time of peace. The same thing occurs in other
economic phenomena, such as a gold rush, a uranium
strike, a new highway, a railway or the St. Lawrence
Waterway. One area is distressed; 3aother is
incremented by increased activity.
According to this attitude, which was enthusiastically espoused by contract
sellers, the real estate market place is a haven for courageous specula-
tors and the low-income black consumer's plight is a gold mine.
Since contract sellers did not themselves create the dual housing
market, these realtors believed they were not guilty of exploitation and
discrimination. They simply took advantage of an existing bad housing
situation to extract maximum profits. That homes were sold at prices
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far in excess of their fair market value was coincidental. As expressed
by one realtor's lawyer, "there is no law of any kind which requires a
man to sell his property only at fair value. This is one of the most basic
of all concepts in our economic system... (that) 'on sale of property the
parties may make such a bargain as they can agree upon.. . ' 1 (34)
Legislation protecting the consumer has long been neglected, while laws
originally designed to protect sellers from undue losses have been abused
by unscrupulous sellers. Yet, this lack of regulation protecting the
consumer against grossly inequitable market conditions does not justify
the exploitation approved by this lawyer and the contract sellers.
No longer does the cash-and-carry society exist. Instead, the
acquisition of goods and services on credit has become an integral part
of the American way of life. While mushrooming growth and expansion
of consumer credit has occurred, however, alterations of the nation's
laws to reflect these changing conditions have been made very slowly and
often in an ad hoc way to deal with specific problems. During this gradual
change consumers who are considered poor credit risks like the contract
buyers have suffered. Low-income consumers pay inflated prices for
inferior goods and services, because they are restricted to a sector of
the market operated by sellers willing to extend them credit. (35) Tele-
vision sets are sold at prices several times greater than their value,
then reclaimed as soon as the low- income consumers miss a payment and
sold to other unwary purchasers at only slightly reduced prices; cheap
watches, jewelry, and household goods are peddled from door to door in
ghetto areas and sold at high prices to housewives unable to determine
their real value; and furnaces are repaired with used or poor-quality
parts that soon cease to function. The small businesses usually serving
low-income consumers justify their high prices as essential to offset the
risk of selling on credit to low- income people. Ballooned prices, rapid
repossession, and poor-quality goods are considered reasonable compen-
sations for losses often incurred when dealing with consumers who have
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very low or unstable incomes. That the size of these compensations is
not always warranted by the amount of risk taken is too frequently ignored.
It is unfair to compare contract sellers with a few profiteering
ghetto retailers without first analyzing the risk these real estate agents
took in selling homes to blacks. Rapid repossession of homes, sales
prices above market values, and poor construction or dwelling condition
might well be reasonable given the context in which sales were made. In
fact, the contract sellers may be considered beneficent for they alone
extended credit to blacks when all other access to credit for housing pur-
chases was closed. To finance real estate transactions an investor inter-
posed his own credit rating between that of the buyer and a lending
institution, thus taking responsibility for a loan that was actually paid off
through him by a contract purchaser. In return for assuming this
responsibility and in effect guaranteeing the loan's repayment to a money
lender, the contract seller received from the buyer the mort-
gage amount plus a premium.
When land installment contracts are used correctly, this premium
adequately repays the investor for providing long term credit and does
not impose excessive costs on the buyer. Whether used for low- income
black or white consumers, land installment contracts usually require a
larger ratio of profit to purchase cost than is needed for conventional
mortgages to middle-income consumers. According to data gathered on
contract sales in Baltimore, Maryland, the average difference between
the original purchase cost of a dwelling and the contract price is 80
percent. (36) For example, a building acquired for $7, 000 was sold
for $13, 000 on contract with a profit of $6, 000. As analyzed by Michael
Stegman, this mark-up was at least partially negated by several expenses
including financing charges to the investor, title searches, renovation
and decoration expenses, commission, and overhead. When discounted
to its present value, the profit received during the entire repayment
period was even further reduced. A profit of about 12 percent was
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usually attainable, but the risk of selling to a low-income consumer was
barely offset.
Although Stegman's analysis identifies reasons for the mark-up
required by most contract sales, his analysis does not fully apply to
contract sales in Chicago. Sellers received more than a moral uplift
when they bought and sold realestate in racially transitional neighbor-
hoods. Large profits were obtained, because costs were not high. In
Lawndale, for instance, contract sellers seldom incurred the costs of
title searches, or renovation and decoration expenses that were considered
a major expenditure in Stegman's analysis. Most importantly, many
sellers of old homes on Chicago's West Side bought the houses at panic
prices and sold them at prices in excess of their fair market value. As
Stegman admits, larger returns are feasible when contract sellers obtain
(38)properties from distressed white owners.
B. Unreasonable Terms and Inflated Prices
During the 1950 Lawndale's contract sellers received large
profits. Although these speculators risked the possibility of default by
low-income consumers, their investments were usually well protected.
Because buildings were acquired at low prices, speculators' cash involve-
ment in the property was limited. As I discussed earlier, one investor
made a $2, 000 down payment on a $14, 000 house and obtained a $12, 000
mortgage. His cash investment was soon reduced to $500 when a contract
buyer purchased the house for $25, 000 and made a $2, 000 down payment.
Since the monthly payments for the seller were much lower than those
of the contract buyer, the seller had no difficulty making his mortgage
payments and netting a profit as long as the contract buyer paid regularly.
Under similar terms most speculators could anticipate annual returns
of thirty to forty percent. (39) Data showing sellers' costs and returns
have not been systematically analyzed to confirm this idea, but from
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conversations with realtors who operated in Lawndale during the 195 0 s
and with their lawyers I concluded that the transactions conducted in
Lawndale were much more lucrative than those made in Baltimore
according to Stegman's study.
Contract terms also protected the sellers' investments and in-
sured large profits during the early years of contract selling in Lawndale.
Land installment contracts contained stipulations devised mainly to pro-
tect the seller. One cause of complaints by the contract buyers was the
high cost of insurance and real estate taxes that were paid in addition to
monthly installment payments. Insurance premiums and taxes are
usually paid by the purchaser even when traditional mortgages are used,
because the property is considered a security and must be protected
against liens or lapses of insurance that can decrease its value, For the
contract buyer, however, this requirement was particularly onerous. In
most cases the contract seller was named as beneficiary of homeowners'
policies. The seller was protected in case of fire or other damage, and
usually recovered his investment while the buyer lost all. In order to
provide this protection of the speculator's investment, the contract
buyer had to pay high insurance premiums. Because most quality in-
surance companies refused to provide coverage in areas labelled as high
risks because of racial transition, blacks had to pay substandard compan-
ies an average of $100 more per year for partial fire coverage than for
(40)full coverage from quality insurance companies.
The cost of repairs was also shifted from realtor to buyer. As
Stegman observes, renovation and decoration costs may usurp a large
(41)
portion of the seller's profit from land installment contract sales.
In Chicago this was not a problem for the seller. Properties were not
improved in the two or three days between acquisition and sale, and even
major housing code violations were neglected. Since it was unnecessary
to ornament a product already craved by black consumers, speculators
pawned off houses in very bad states of repair. Despite a realtor's verbal
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guarantee that a property was in good condition, the appearance of Chicago
building code inspectors too frequently proved the contrary. In one case
a black couple was compelled to spend $2, 500 on repairs, as the result
of a building inspector's visit only three weeks after they moved into
their newly acquired home. (42)
Monthly installment payments, insurance premiums, real estate
taxes, and repair costs occasionally proved too great for the low- income
purchaser. In case of default speculators did not always play the villain
moving families into and out of housing as quickly as strong market
demand would allow. Especially during the early years of contract sales
in Lawndale, speculators who wanted to reap a profit quickly tried to
retain contract buyers with histories ot regular payments, because con-
tracts with buyers who had good credit standings could be assigned to
investors looking for sound real estate ventures. By assigning his interests
to another investor, the speculator rapidly recovered his investment before
the neighborhood and consequently the housing market declined. Missed
installment payments were often ignored and families encouraged to con-
tinue the contractual agreement. By sympathizing with the little old lady
or family of ten and allowing some delinquencies, the realtor protected his
investment.
As Lawndale declined pressure on both the contract buyer and
seller increased. Many speculators had long ago recovered their invest-
ments and a substantial profit when deterioration constricted further
returns. These speculators had already paid off their mortgages and had
to pay only insurance and taxes on their properties. Buildings in default
and very bad physical condition were unhesitatingly abandoned by the
investor without loss. Other realtors even benefited from this situation.
They acted as landlords without assuming any of the responsibilities of
that position. Because contract buyers had to pay insurance premiums
in addition to monthly installment payments, the purchaser's monthly
obligations were increased as the neighborhood declined and insurance
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premiums rose. If as in the case of Ruth Wells, the buyer was not ade-
quately informed of these increases, he made the specified minimum
installment payments each month without signifidantly reducing the
principle. In this way the contract buyer sometimes unknowingly became
the equivalent of a permanent renter and building superintendent diligently
paying the seller-landlord.
Some realtors and assignees were understandably outraged by the
Contract Buyers League's demands for contract renegotiations. Having
purchased in Lawndale after the market declined, their investments had
not been recovered or brought significant profits. Provisions of land
installment contracts were being utilized to lessen valid risks to these
sellers. The woes of the contract seller were many. The realtor's credit
was threatened by a buyer's default because the realtor still had a mort-
gage outstanding. Also, new contract buyers were not easily located to
replace defaulting buyers. Demand for Lawndale homes had decreased,
as housing opportunities opened to blacks in other parts of Chicago and
deterioration devaluated the West Side community. The aspiring home-
owners once so easily lured to Lawndale evaded the area. As the number
of applicants for homes decreased, careful screening of buyers was
almost impossible. This greatly aggravated the difficulty of managing
West Side property. Despite determined attempts to provide personalized,
full-time servicing of accounts themost dedicated realtor found it difficult
to collect payments from poorly selected buyers. When a realtor lost a
contract buyer during the 1960s, the seller's investment usually went
with him; for in the declining area buildings vacated for more than a few
days were usually stripped and often gutted by fire. The high risk of
default andtotal losses existed; and realtors demanded large profits on
their few successful ventures to compensate for these losses and insure
future capital investment.
Contract buyers were also harmed by Lawndale's decay, as repair
and maintenance costs increased, Because during the 1960s sellers
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were unwilling to invest capital in buildings surrounded by dilapidated
structures, contract buyers, especially those purchasing dwellings
following default, often inherited many building code violations and bad
states of repair. The high price charged to these buyers almost insured
subsequent default. If the purchase price and accordingly monthly install-
ment payments had been lowered, contract buyers would have been better
able to absorb the rising insurance and maintenance costs; neighborhood
decline would perhaps have been abated; and contract sellers would have
been assured of some profit.
Evidence does not show that contract sellers needed as much pro-
tection against default as inflated prices and oppressive contract terms
provided. Even Stegman's analysis of contract sales in Baltimore assumed
a high default rate that did not actually occur. (43) As several studies
have shown, most credit patterns of low-income consumers are based on
such time purchases as automobiles and household furnishings that are
(44)
not good indicators of reliability as home purchasers. ( Not until the
Contract Buyers League began its activities did realtors in Chicago com-
plain of high default rates; and these were not caused by the buyers' lack
of responsibility but their planned protest.
On Chicago's South Side the high price of housing was not even
justified by the risk of selling to low-income consumers. Englewood was
a largely middle-class black community. While a large number of people
who bought homes there had low incomes, many others had stable, moderate
(45)
incomes and were able to make substantial down payments on their homes.
All blacks, however, purchasing from Universal Builders or its subsidiary
land companies had to use land installment contracts. Because they were
black; these prospective homeowners were treated as low-income con-
sumers and forced to pay high premiums for their homes. The lack of
alternative financing methods and the limited supply of housing in the black
submarket insured that Universal's terms were accepted.
Like consumers who are considered poor credit risks by ghetto
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retailers, the contract buyer paid a high price for a low-quality product.
Instead of charging very high interest rates, Universal Builders raised
the price of housing units far above their fair market values. This
usurious form of hidden interest rates is usually illegal when it occurs
in loans; but in sales the increase is difficult to identify and is often
accepted as a valid increase because of strong market demand.
The quality of Universal-built homes did not account for high
sales prices. Poor construction, and unfinished work caused constant
complaints by the buyers. These single-family houses had ceilings that
collapsed, foundations that were thin and cracked, and amenities that
were not provided despite extra charges for them.
Several real estate appraisers familiar with Englewood attempted
to determine fair market values of the homes. In selecting comparable
housing they looked at quality, quantity, and surrounding environments
of housing, but not the financing mechanism used for its purchase. Most
houses chosen were mortgaged. Consistently these appraisals based on
property values and states of repair at the time of purchase were lower
than prices charged by Universal Builders and its subsidiaries.
Using sales of comparable homes both in the predominantly black neigh-
borhood of Englewood and two white neighborhoods, one appraiser dis-
covered that on the average the contract prices charged by Universal and
its ten land companies exceeded fair market value by $6, 508 or 34. 5
(46)percent. Table 1 includes some of these appraisals. These findings
were supported by another appraiser's somewhat lower figures. Using
the same appraisal method but different comparable property he concluded
that the controversial South Side-homes were priced on an average of
20. 6 percent above their fair market value. (47)
Prior to construction appraisals were made of these homes, when
Universal Builders applied to several savings and loan associations for
construction mortgages. Even these appraisals using the replacement
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Table 1
A Comparison of the Appraised Values and Contract
Prices of South Side Homes
Address of Dwelling
8528 S. Calumet
9418 S. Emerald
9651 S. Yale
517 E. 87th St.
9141 S. Halsted
431 W. 97th P1.
1350 W. 115th St.
9420 S. Eggleston
9627 S. Yale
9410 S. Emerald
551 W. 95th St.
9218 S. Eggleston
9246 S. Eggleston
205 E. 87th
8632 S. Wabash
8304 S. Rhodes
9212 S. Parnell
9405 S. Lowe
9431 S. Emerald
9431 S. Lowe
7834 S. Wabash
Averages
Average Excess
Contract
Price
$32, 450
$22, 450
$23, 950
$24, 200
$24, 350
$20, 450
$27, 950
$24, 950
$20, 950
$27, 450
$29, 950
$25, 950
$31, 950
$26, 300
$26, 250
$22, 950
$26, 500
$19, 450
$22, 450
$26, 450
$27,250
$25, 376
Appraisal Land
Company*
$23,000 Chatham
$17, 000 Independence
$15,500 Lawson
$16,500 Rosewood
$18,500 Rosewood
$16,000 Lawson
$21,500 Rosewood
$19,500 Hamilton
$16,000 Rosewood
$18,000 Lawson
$22,500 Hamilton
$19,000 Hamilton
$23, 000 Hamilton
$18, 500
$19, 500
$16, 000
$20, 000
$18, 000
$17, 500
$20, 500
$21, 000
$18,868
Independence
Jarvis
Independence
Larchmont
Jarvis
Jarvis
Independence
Larchmont
Contract
Date
2/17/61
10/7/59
9/19/62
12/14/62
9/6/62
12/20/61
7/17/64
8/25/66
9/16/64
8 /20/60
11/2/66
4/28/67
10/11/66
6/13/61
11/14/58
7/18/60
9/28/61
8/26/58
7/3/58
3 /31/59
5/2/58
of Contract Price over Appraisal =$6, 508
* The land companies are all subsidiaries of Universal Builders, Inc.
Source :'Official transcript," Clark v. Universal Builders, pp. 3448-3616.
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cost method showed that sales prices exceeded the fair market value by
an average of 20. 9 percent.(48) In making these appraisals a per
square foot cost of constructing the type of house appraised was obtained
from a standard appraisal manual and multiplied times the number of
square feet in the house. To this price was added the land value and an
allowa-nce for the seller's overhead and profit of 16 percent.
This allowance for profit was apparently lower than the contract
sellers deemed acceptable. At no time in dealing with the Contract
Buyers League did the developers explain their high prices as essential
when selling to low-income consumers. If risk of operating in this
section of the housing market had been cited as the basis for their pricing,
it could not have been supported; for the default rate on the 1, 300 new
homes purchased on contract was very low. In any case, sellers con-
sidered it legitimate to make as large a profit as the tight black housing
submarket allowed. Considering themselves benefactors because they
served the black community, they even believed they were aiding the
efficient market system by charging prices only within reach of blacks with
high incomes, and consequently the strongest effective demand. High
prices, as Universal interpreted them, were a necessary rationing method
for the limited black housing supply.
The land installment contracts they used, however, were designed
for low-income consumers. Contracts used by South Side developers
contained clauses to insure a profitable return. When combined with the
high sales prices, these restrictions gave the seller unfair advantages.
Among the terms were changeable interest rates. Although interest rates
charged were usually no more than 0. 5 percent about the market level,
these rates could be rapidly increased when payments were missed. In
one instance, a buyer's interest rate was raised from 6. 5 percent to
8. 0 percent when the buyer, active in the Contract Buyers League, missed
one payment. Also, charged to the buyer were attorney's fees expended
in changing this rate.
50
_j
None of Universal's contracts specified the term over which
payments were to be made. (51) When calculated, the repayment periods
were very long. Although the average contract term was 28 years 4
months, one contract ran for 46 years 4 months, another for 42 years,
and 15 for more than 35 years. (52)
Another clause misused by Universal Builders stated that buyers
could not make any improvements without the seller's permission. While
this clause is included in contracts to forestall improvements theX buyer
cannot afford and resulting mechanics liens, in this case it led to high
improvement costs for the buyer. Many buyers were refused permission
to make improvements until they agreed to employ Douglas Lumber
(53)
Company which Universal's subsidiary land companies happened to own.
With all competition eliminated, this company could charge what it con-
sidered reasonable. Given the profit margins acceptable to Universal
Builders, it is understandable that the prices charged were high.
After making improvements the buyer was subject to increased
housing costs; for Universal's contracts provided that if a land company
increased its mortgage, the buyer would assume the mortgage and be
bound by its terms. Several homes were reappraised after improvements
were made; and Universal received new mortgages known as 'recast
loans,' which buyers had to repay. (54)
As in Lawndale, contract buyers were trapped in their Englewood
homes once the down payment was made and installment payments begun.
Only by forfeiting their entire investments could buyers cancel the contract
before the last payment was made, because transfer of the buyer's rights
could only occur with the seller's permission. Even though Englewood
was a stable community in which property values were rising and new
buyers were easily found, the contract buyer's fate was in the hands of
the contract sellers. Frequently sellers promised mortgages in "about
five years, I (55) that would have given the buyer control of the property,
but never lived up to these promises. In 1968 most purchasers who had
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not paid off their debt in cash or relinquished the property remained
subservient to the contract sellers.
The issue of racial discrimination is only of secondary importance.
Because of a limited housing supply and restricted credit, consumers
considered poor credit risks - - in this case blacks - - were forced to pay
extraordinarily high prices for property they did not control. Since data
are not readily available on contract sales of comparable housing to
whites in Chicago, (56) the contract terms for this group cannot be
presented here. Yet, a cogent argument showing economic discrimination
can be made. Even the contract buyers' lawyers when presenting their
cases before the Federal Court, according to one judge, formed a case of
(57)
"exploitation for profit, and not racial discrimination" as they had
intended.
C. Pickets and Payment Strikes
Whether racial or economic discrimination prompted the high
prices charged by contract sellers was of little concern, when the contract
buyers tried to renegotiate contracts. Because contract buyers had not
renegotiated more than the fifty contracts held by one seller as the result
of talks and pickets, they decided to change their tactics in the fall of
1968. The group had been strengthened by members active participation
in the pickets and felt prepared in December, 1968 to begin a payment
strike. Both West and South Side buyers joined in the strike which received
favorable publicity and support within the Chicago area.
Contract sellers unsympathetic to the buyers' demands formed
the Real Estate Investors Association to oppose CBL. Complaining that
taxes, insurance, and their mortgages still had to be paid, contract
sellers began to consider the inexpensive and rapid eviction process used
for tenants and contract buyers. Suddenly the ghetto real estate was
viewed as a valuable investment that contract sellers wanted to protect.
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In the first month of the strike, 327 families withheld from South and
West Side sellers payments amounting to $63, 000. These funds deposited
in the form of money orders in the Contract Buyers League office grew
rapidly as more buyers joined the strike. Within three months 595
~58)families withheld approximately a quarter of a million dollars; and
the sellers' anguish increased.
More than these installment payments to the contract sellers
were lost. In Lawndale the community lost as well. Frustrated buyers
began to view the holdout as a means of breaking the contractual agree-
ment without losing their entire investments. Instead of depositing their
monthly payments with CBL where the money was available to the buyers
in case immediate payment was required, some buyers kept the funds
themselves. To their own payments were added the rents of the two-
and three- flat dwellings, whenever renters agreed to join the strike.
During the first payment strike, which lasted five months, this
was not a problem, but during the second holdout begun in July, 1969,
some buyers collected several months' rent and moved away. Leaving
behind buildings for which tenants could not easily be found, and on
which sellers were no longer willing to pay mortgages, taxes, and
insurance, these contract buyers in effect accelerated abandonment and
Lawndale's decay.
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CHAPTER IT
THE START OF LEGAL ACTION
A. The Eviction Process
When faced with opposition the contract sellers of Lawndale did
not at first retaliate. Some of their tenant-buyers had walked away from
buildings leaving these sellers to rent and manage their own declining
properties. Even fire insurance paid by buyers could not be collected by
the sellers who were named as beneficiaries; for when possible, departing
contract buyers arranged to save these buildings from the fires that often
destroyed vacant dwellings in Lawndale.
Universal's officials were more offended than West Side sellers
that buyers used illegal payment strikes, and they started eviction pro-
cedures as soon as CBL initiated the second strike. Thus began a
series of battles testing the legality of Illinois' Forcible Entry and
Detainer Act, which grants summary eviction of trespassers, squatters,
tenants and contract buyers. Buyers were not only evicted quickly like
residents with few rights, but also, given no opportunity to protect their
interests. According to this law, contract buyers were not allowed to
defend themselves in court, unless they sought to prove that they had
actually made all payments and were begin evicted unjustly. No other
defenses, such as unconscionability of the realty contract, could be
presented in court. A buyer's only recourse was to appeal the court's
decision within five days. In order to do this, however, a large appeal
bond had to be posted consisting of more than a year's payments.
Since the low- income consumer who utilizes land installment
contracts was usually unable to obtain cash for a large appeal bond,
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especially within such a brief period of time, he was denied protection
by the law. Again the land installment contract proved to be an inequitable
agreement allowing full protection of the seller and very little protection
for the buyer. In questioning the constitutionality of the eviction law the
contract buyer asserted the consumer's right to seek relief from unfair
contract terms to which he had of necessity agreed.
Even with the strength of numerous buyers, their supporters,
and favorable public opinion, the Contract Buyers League hesitated to
challenge this law; and many South Side members and a few West Side
families participating in the payment strike were evicted without making
appeals. At first the League successfully thwarted Universal Builders'
attempts to evict buyers by simply refusing to vacate property and promptly
reinstating in their homes any members removed by the Cook County
Sheriff and his men. As in the case of the Moss family discussed at the
beginning of this paper, CBL's members and supporters uncovered
Sheriff Joseph Wood's plans and hastened to homes where evictions were
to occur in time to block the Sheriff's entrance or return to the homes
furniture and possessions removed by the Sherriff's men. In each case
the Sherriff perfunctorily cited the buyer for criminal trespassing and
departed without protest. While most newspapers and radio stations
lamented contract sellers' threats to remove over 1, 000 families from
their over-priced homes, the contract buyers continued their game of
police watching with the Sheriff's help. Even Mayor Richard Daley was
amiable to the buyers. Entering the act he attmepted to mediate nego-
tiations between CBL and both the South and West Side sellers, but was
unable to arrange terms acceptable to the.parties.
The game did not last long. Pressured by Universal Builders
which sued Woods for discontinuing evictions, the S heriff began to
successfully evict buyers; and the League began to realize that only in
the Illinois State court case, Rosewood Corporation versus Chester and
Julia Fisher, did they have hope of changing the law and stopping evictions.
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The decision to take this case to court caused much conflict among
the contract buyers. First of all, many CBL members did not support
the second payment strike which led to the evictions. Instead these
buyers favored devoting all efforts to supporting two class action cases in
the Federal Court. These lawsuits were brought by the buyers against
the contract sellers. Lawyers who had volunteered their services to the
League in order to press these two Federal cases believed it would be
easier to prove that the contracts' terms were unconscionable in the two
Federal cases directly concerned with the problem than in numerous
individual eviction cases where the issue of unconscionability was only
secondary. At the same time, CBL members hesitated to use money
from installment payments held by the League to post costly appeal bonds.
Not enough money was available to post bonds for all members involved
in the strike, and the organization did not want to jeopardize the position
of one member in favor of another. Although $350, 000 was eventually
pledged to a bond fund by various individuals, organizations, and Jesuits
across the country, CBL decided to appeal only one eviction case, that
involving the Fishers; and a bond was posted using funds donated by one
devoted supporter.
Out of Rosewood versus Fisher came a ruling in 1970 allowing
defendants to present their reasons for discontinuing payments. The
low-income consumer was further aided by the elimination of appeal
bonds required when questioning a court's original eviction decision.
Applied retroactively, this change enabled all those contract purchasers
who had not appealed evictions to retry their cases. Yet, the prospect
of winning eviction cases was of little interest to the Contract Buyers
League. Fisher had been able to remain in his home for four years
without making payments while Rosewood Corporation, a subsidiary of
Universal Builders, paid taxes, insurance and the underlying mortgage,
but no permanent solution had been found. The Illinois State Court made
no decision on the unconscionability of the contract terms; and Rosewood
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appealed for another decision on the eviction insisting that the terms were
reasonable. The Fishers still faced eviction or acceptance of the land
installment contract's terms. If the contract buyers were to renegotiate
their contracts and be reimbursed for over-payments, another means of
attacking the contract sellers would have to be used.
B. Federal Court Cases
Chicago's black contract buyers did not wait to be taken to court
by sellers before demanding their rights as housing consumers from
the judicial system. As soon as the decision to conduct the first payment
strike was made, the Contract Buyers League initiated legal action
against the contract sellers. In this way the League attempted to prove
its willingness to work within established systems for change as well
as against institutionalized business practices.
Filed at first as one case before United States District Court
Judge Hubert L. Will, the contract buyers' legal action was eventually
divided into two cases and assigned to other judges. The case involving
new homes on the South Side, Sidney Clark versus Universal Builders,
was tried before Judge Sam Perry in 1972. At the time of this writing
the other case involving sales of old homes on Chicago's West Side has
not been brought to trial. The case, known as Charles Baker versus
F and F Investment, implicated about seventy realtors, assignees, and
financial institutions.
The Contract Buyers League did not attempt to change the
characteristic use of land installment contracts for the good of society,
yet its protests may affect far more than Chicago's 3, 000 black buyers.
This organization was primarily concerned with renegotiating the
contracts of its members and participants in the class actions brought
against contract sellers in the Federal Courts. Yet, CBL chose a
method of protest that benefited other low-income housing consumers
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forced to use these contracts. By challenging the legality of their own
land contracts, black buyers began a process redefining the low- incomer's
rights in real estate transactions. For several reasons the League
sought reconciliation through the lengthy judicial process instead of
settling directly with realtors, and thus not affecting other land contract
sales. Most importantly, many buyers feared being evicted from the
homes they had worked so long to purchase.
During the second payment strike dissension developed among the
contract buyers over the form of protest to be used and about thirty
South Side buyers left the organization. Although most CBL members
preferred working within the legal system, the splinter group insisted
that payment strikes were the only effective means of forcing sellers to
comply to revised contract terms. During the first strike West Side
sellers had acceded to changing several contracts. As soon as payments
were resumed, however, the sellers could more easily meet their own
financial responsibilities such as payment of mortgages and were no
longer concerned with the buyers' demands. Only when the second strike
began were numerous renegotiations made again. With this strike came
evictions and fear among the members that its continuence would cause
great losses to participating families. Fearful that evictions would
shatter the organization's public and internal image, the leaders decided
to discontinue the strike. They did not want the League to be known as
the cause of hardship for its members; nor did they wish to lessen the
group's strength by using tactics that alienated most members.
Another factor also influenced CBL's decision to rely on legal
action. Responding to protests by Universal Builders and the West Side
realtors, Judge Will, then presiding over the cases, declared that all
contmct buyers continuing with the payment strike would be excluded
from the plaintiff classes in the lawsuits. Since most buyers had at that
time withheld no more than $2, 000 each and they could expect $8, 000 to
$10, 000 savings if the Federal Court decided in their favor, most buyers
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preferred working within the legal system to continuing the payment
(59)
strike. Little did they realize how long the legal process would
take, or how difficult it. would be to prove that their distress over monthly
installment payments was the result of exploitation in the housing market
place.
C. An Indictment of Financial Institutions
The contract buyers brought suit against other participants in
the housing market system than contract sellers. They named several
banks, savings and loan companies, and federal agencies as defendants
on the grounds that by refusing credit to black purchasers these estab-
lishments played a major role in creating the artificially restricted
housing market that encouraged contract buying.
To understand the black consumer's poor bargaining position,
the effect of financial institutions on the availability of credit must be
considered. Inequities developed not only because society institutionalized
racial and economic discrimination which restricted blacks' housing
choices and realtors extracted the highest possible prices in a tight
market, but also, because financial institutions refused to serve black
consumers thus limiting their ability to purchase. Society cannot easily
be punished for its wrongs, but the other perpetrators can be and were
condemned by the contract buyers. Although financial institutions were
not included in the litigation involving Universal Builders, both Federal
loan guaranteeing agencies and conventional financing establishments
were named as defendants in the case Baker versus F and F Investment.
Among the culprits restricting credit for blacks and low- income
consumers were the Federal Housing Administration and the Veterans
Administration. Designed to stimulate housing development and home
ownership, FHA and VA catered only to the needs of middle-class,
usually white families in home ownership programs. This action was
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justified by the need to reduce FHA losses from foreclosures. Assuming
that low- income or black people would have a high default rate, Federal
agencies set both minimum credit standards and guidelines for deter-
mining a buyer's ability to make payments. Those who did not meet these
standards were not ignored completely. The government certainly pro-
vided adequate shelter for low-income people but only in the form of
rental housing. Under low-rent programs FHA built thousands of sub-
sidized units, and public housing proliferated. Yet, few low-income
people moved into the expanding suburbs where their middle- income
contemporaries comfortably settled with the Federal government's aid.
Federal programs established two distinct classes, each living in housing
inaccessible to the other. Just as low-income people were excluded from
home ownership by their inability to meet minimum credit standards,
higher income people were not admitted to some subsidized rental
housing because their incomes were too high. For many years there was
little economic integration within housing projects; and only the poor
occupied public housing.
Middle- income people did not complain when they were not allowed
in public housing, but accepted home ownership. Occasionally dwelling
units were not as soundly constructed as owners would have liked showing
that FHA did not totally control the quality of housing produced; but
generally these programs were popular and the homes acceptable. The
poor, however, still aspired to home ownership and found subsidized
rental housing a poor substitute.
The Federal Housing Administration was more interested in its
financial solvency than the low-income consumer's plight. Although
created to decrease lending institutions' risk of investment and thus
stimulate housing development, before 1968 FHA had several policies
that insured its profitability by limiting its own risk and consequently
its effectiveness. "Redlining" was a common practice by FHA to protect
its interests. Under this policy dwellings in certain areas of cities such
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as Chicago were ineligible for FHA guaranteed loans. Rationalizing
this policy on economic grounds FHA refused to expend money in usually
black neighborhoods where the agency claimed that the economic life of
buildings was insufficient to warrant further investment. As soon as an
area began to change racially, dwelling units were considered economi-
cally unsound even by this government agency which was designed to
stabilize and increase the standard housing stock. Economic soundness
and credit ratings were determined by race. This policy corresponded
well to earlier FHA criteria for urban development. As one FHA under-
writing manual stated, "If a neighborhood is to continue to retain stability,
it is necessary that properties shall continue to be occupied by the same
social and racial groups. " (60) FHA encouraged restrictive covenants
that limited the sale of property in an area to certain racially homo-
genous groups while it excluded transitional communities from ownership
programs because they were supposedly doomed to instability.
Blacks were, then, excluded from neighborhoods receiving
Federally guaranteed home loans and unable to obtain this financial
backing in the "economically unsound" areas in which they lived. Yet,
this was not the only negative influence FHA had on neighborhoods con-
sidered poor investment risks. Because the protection of Federal
guarantees were not available, most conventional lending institutions
refused to make loans in these areas to people with low credit ratings.
While readily granting mortgages to contract sellers operating in Lawn-
dale, and construction loans to developers in Englewood, most lenders
labelled the areas as economically unsound. Their attitude toward
investment opportunities in the areas was based on the credit ratings of
black consumers, ratings obtained from collection records for time
purchases such as automobiles and household furnishings. These
institutions conjectured that the default rate on mortgage payments would
be similarly high.
As when purchasing consumer durables, low- income, often black
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consumers were captive in a housing market devoid of significant free
choice where prices were high and quality low. In the consumption of
housing even more than the purchase of durables, the low-income consumer
was unjustly charged. Because housing is often a one-time investment
requiring a substantial expenditure over a long period of time, overcharg-
ing 40 percent on a $12, 000 house is significantly more oppressive than
inflating the cost of a $25 watch by 300 percent. The overcharge usually
occurs, however, because this consumer group is assumed to be un-
willing or at least unable to make payments. Prices spiral and responsi-
bilities increase as sellers impose many conditions on sales. Demand
is satisfied, but only at great expense to the consumer. Behind this
situation stand financial institutions complaining of risky investments
in economically unsound areas, while collecting monthly mortgage pay-
ments from contract sellers with lucrative businesses there.
Even the government disregarded consumers residing in these
areas, and in the name of good business practice refused them credit.
But, contract sellers were not negligent. From this supposedly
dessicated economic area contract sellers drained profits higher than
those possible in FHA's stable neighborhoods and more detrimental to
the financial security of the consumers.
The low-income consumer was denied protection available to
higher income consumers that insure the value of their housing purchases.
As John Mixon asserts in his study of land installment sales in Houston,
Texas, the contract buyer is not protected by a system of favorable
institutions that control his purchasing activities. Unlike the middle-
income consumer whose interests are protected by financial intermedi-
aries securing their investments, the low-income consumer usually deals
directly with the seller who provides both goods and credit. The checks
on sellers afforded by FHA, mortgage lenders and the entire system of
common law and statutory protection, which has been developed over the
years to define mortgage transactions, are non-existent for the contract
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buyer. At the mercy of the contract seller, he is left to defend him-
self. (61)
In the case of land installment sales, the contract purchaser in
Chicago was not aware of threats to his investment. Title searches,
usually required by lenders before mortgages are approved, were not
made for contract sales. Unaware of possible claims on the seller's
property, the contract buyer accepted the seller's assertion that he could
convey an uncontested title. The contract seller, who had up to twenty-
five years to collect payments before transferring the deed, was not
concerned that the buyer might never have clear ownership of the property.
Similarly, the property's true value was seldom determined. Middle-
class buyers are assured against over payment by the intervention of
moneylenders who refuse to grant mortgages for amounts far above a
dwelling's fair market value. Although the appraisal required to determine
market value is an added transactional cost for the middle-income con-
sumer, it is considerably lower than over-charges made possible when
purchase prices are inflated. The low-income consumer, however,
unwittingly accepts the seller's price as correct, and as in the case of
Chicago's contract buyers, often pays unreasonable amounts for housing.
Instead of being protected against exploitative transactions, the
contract buyer is labelled a poor credit risk, excluded from sections of
the housing market, and forced to pay exhorbitant prices for housing and
credit because he lacks sophistication in handling real estate. Yet,
home ownership is extended to an economic class to which it is otherwise
denied. The question arises; in eliminating or drastically reforming land
contract purchases, is the low-income buyer excluded from the housing
market ?
In Chicago this was a major concern of the Contract Buyers
League even before the formal protests began. For the buyers who
eventually made their last payments and received title to a home, the
financing mechanism was a useful though expensive means of attaining a
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dream. Only those purchasers paying high insurance rates, taxes and
installments found land contracts to be an evil without benefits. The
return to rental housing was an insignificant change for the over-
burdened buyers who would probably never own their homes. The
advantages and disadvantages of contract buying were weighed; for
although the Contract Buyers League was concerned mainly with renego-
tiating purchase prices for black buyers in Chicago and riot with changing
the institution of land contract sales, the two objectives were inevitably
interrelated. As the contract buyers realized in 1968, the most immedi-
ate problem following the sellers' agreement to refinance housing would be
locating mortgage funds. Unless CBL changed financial institutions'
attitudes that encouraged land contract sales for low-income consumers,
this achievement would be impossible.
One of the primary goals of CBL was to channel mortgage money
into predominantly black areas of Chicago. Jack Macnamara and several
contract buyers set out to obtain pledges for home loans from several
savings and loan associations and banks in Chicago soon after the League
was formed. As the Federal case, Baker versus F and F Investment,
progressed and lending institutions were included among the defendants,
this effort was greatly facilitated. Seeking to avoid the litigation,
several lending establishments volunteered their services and made
large commitments for loans in the area. Just before CBL became
active FHA changed its policies, and no longer practiced redlining.
Since 1968 both FHA and conventional mortgages have been used to pur-
chase or refinance homes in both Lawndale and Englewood.
In Chicago, then, the low-income consumer was not denied access
to home ownership when the use of land installment contracts decreased
as a result of CBL's actions. Where once only contract sellers operated
absorbing allegedly high risks and receiving large profits are now
conventional lenders and Federal loan guaranteeing agencies. For the
fortunate few who renegotiated contracts or now purchase homes on
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mortgage in Chicago's black neighborhoods, the Contract Buyers League's
activities have been beneficial. The buyer now receives not only greater
security as title holder of his property, but also, institutionalized pro-
tection against bad investments that was previously available only to
middle-class consumers. Yet, CBL has not yet attained its goal. Al-
though approximately 150 contracts on the West Side have been renego-
tiated out of court decreasing the total cost of housing for these families
(62)by $1, 750, 000 , this is only a small fraction of all land contracts
in Lawndale; and no contracts involving new homes on the South Side
have been changed. The contract buyers' efforts continue.
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CHAPTER V
PROTEST THROUGH THE LEGAL SYSTEM
A. Contract BuyerS Allegations
By virtue of pleading, picketing, and striking 150 families'
contracts were changed, but thousands of other black contract buyers
were not affected by the League's actions. These buyers' only apparent
recourse was the legal system. Abandoning all other forms of protest
as no longer effective, the contract buyers devoted all of their efforts to
winning two lawsuits. In this system where the contract seller was well
protected by common and statutory laws defining consumer- purchaser
relationships, the contract buyer hoped to find solace and compensation
for society's inequities. Yet, if society slowly acknowledges changes in
balances of social and economic power, even more slowly the law follows
with piecemeal adaptations of legislation and judicial decisions. Many
Americans were awakening to the plight of the poor, the black, and the
abused consumer, but were unwilling to ameliorate conditions. Welfare
services have been provided but are condemned as extravagant gifts to
the lazy for which the over-burdened taxpayer must pay; open housing has
been approved as long as blacks locate in other people's neighborhoods;
and the need for consumer protection has been accepted as long as no
restrictions are placed on business dealings. When the Contract Buyers
League opposed realtors and land developers operating lucrative busi-
nesses, it initiated a process of change that legal action did not hasten.
Long established and profitable business practices were not easily
affected by black consumers or their public spirited lawyers.
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That the judicial system did not react quickly or positively to the
Contract Buyers League's action is not unexpected, for the buyers re-
quested a new interpretation of racial discrimination. Hitherto, the
courts held that racial discrimination occurred only when a seller
refused to sell to a potential purchaser because of his race. (63) While
these sellers who caused the limited availability of housing were con-
demned, realtors who exploited the problem by charging the highest
prices that the artificially restricted supply would allow were accepted
as shrewd businessmen conducting legitimate enterprises. No matter
how lucrative a man's business and how exploited his customers, a
businessman selling to blacks was considered their benefactor.
In both Federal Court cases brought against contract sellers,
buyers questioned the right of businessmen to secure profits wherever
they are available. The buyers held that contract sellers were able to
charge excessive prices and earn large profits only because they ex-
ploited the dual housing market. Although the sellers did not themselves
cause the limited supply of housing and in fact increased this supply by
selling to blacks, they charged excessive prices that could not be obtained
for comparable housing in other sectors of the market. Because realtors
sold to blacks at prices far above those whites paid, they were guilty of
racial discrimination.
The traditional reading of Section 1982 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866, which permits realtors to grow wealthy at the expense of blacks,
was rejected by lawyers for the contract buyers. As interpreted by them
the law would for the first time insure that a dollar in the hands of blacks
be equal to a dollar in the hands of whites. This right is denied when as
a consequence of racial discrimination blacks are confined to a small
section of the housing market and then forced by businessmen to pay the
highest prices that market would bear.
Of the two lawsuits brought by the contract buyers only one, Clark
versus Universal Builders, has as yet been tried. In this case lawyers
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for the contract buyers argued that Universal Builders and its subsidiaries
used land installment contracts to extract excessive prices from black
consumers. Even when middle-income blacks who composed a large
portion of the South Side community were able to make sizeable down
payments and regular monthly installments without difficulty, they were
compelled to purchase on contract or look elsewhere in the restricted
market for housing. In this instance, the inflated cost of housing pur-
chased on contract did not result because high prices were needed to
offset the risk of selling to low- income consumers. Land developers
simply believed that the high prices and equally large profits were a
reasonable return on their investments.
Only by using land installment contracts, however, could sellers
reap these profits. If traditional mortgages had been sought by black
purchasers, this income would have ceased, for buyers would have
learned the fair market values of dwellings. As I showed earlier, financial
institutions usually require appraisals of property before mortgages are
granted, and refuse to provide loans of amounts far in excess of a
dwelling's fair market value. Because no financial intermediaries were
involved in Chicago's contract sales, the unsuspecting buyer usually
accepted the contract seller's sales price as reasonable without checking
the dwelling's value. The contract buyers of Englewood claimed that
Universal Builders and several land development companies misused land
installment contracts to charge exorbitant prices, extract large profits,
and require unfair contract provisions in an artificially restricted market
based on race instead of purchasing power.
B. Contract Sellers' Response
In response to the contract buyers' allegations, the sellers of
new homes on Chicago's South Side contended that a businessman's profits
should not be restricted and that no existing laws impose upper limits on
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profits. The sellers insisted that even if buyers proved that they were
over-charged by the sellers, this proof would not show racial discrimina-
tion, which according to the sellers, resulted only when a producer
refused to deal with blacks.
Universal Builders and an associated company did sell to both
black and white consumers, although most sales to whites were made in
Deerfield, Illinois just outside Chicago and usually involved traditional
mortgages. Several whites also purchased homes in Englewood before
the area's racial transition was complete; but information on these sales
was withheld by Universal Builders on the grounds that records were not
kept according to race.
Universal sold to whites in Deerfield on a completely different
basis than they sold to blacks in Englewood. In Clark versus Universal
Builders the contract buyers asserted that although construction materials
and locational characteristics of homes in the suburban community differed
from those in Chicago's South Side homes, the housing was comparable
and could be used to show racial discrimination in pricing. The buyers
claimed that racial discrimination caused housing prices in Deerfield to
be much lower than those in Englewood.
In presenting a case for the contract buyers lawyers first attempted
to show that Universal's homes in Englewood were not better than its homes
in Deerfield, and should not have been sold at higher prices. As an
architect who evaluated the homes in the two areas stated, the residents
of Deerfield received more housing for their dollars than did buyers on
the South Side. (64) According to testimony by architects, economists,
and appraisers, the high prices of South Side homes was not justified
by the materials or construction. With leaky roofs, unsound foundations,
and cracked sidewalks, these homes were not worth the prices. The cost
of land in Chicago, another factor cited by sellers as important, did not
raise the price of dwellings significantly above the cost of homes in
Deerfield, for the ratio of land to building costs was about the same in
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both areas. On the South Side land costs constituted approximately 21
(6 5)
percent of housing costs while in Deerfield this figure was 17 percent.
The comparison of Deerfield and Englewood homes also showed
that prices and the ratio of profit to construction costs were much
greater on the South Side than in Deerfield. As seen in Table 2, houses with
the same construction costs in both areas were higher priced on the South
Side; houses with the same prices had higher construction costs in
Deerfield. (66) Although the cost of construction may vary over time
and with location and type of residential construction permitting prices to
vary, the ratio of profit to construction costs should not differ greatly.
Yet, for Deerfield homes this ratio was constantly lower than that of
Englewood dwellings. Based on calculations by a certified public accountant
using Universal's financial statements, the average profit on the South Side
(67)
was roughly twice that in Deerfield. Using similar models of homes,
the figures in Tables 3 and 4 were calculated showing the differences in
profits made in the two communities. Since neither cost nor quality of
construction justified the variation in prices of homes in the two areas,
the contract buyers claimed that differences were due to racial discrimi-
nation.
Defendants refuted the buyers' claim on several grounds. When
acquired, the Deerfield property had poor highway access and public
transportation, was located so near a railroad that it was undesirable for
families with small children, and was served only by one over-crowded
high school. In 1956 and 1957, the land developers were also operating
under pressures to terminate the Deerfield project as quickly as possible.
Because the housing market there was very competitive, it was difficult
to attract buyers. Sales promotion of the homes was difficult, because
people could not easily view the property. Each weekend when most
people wanted to see the homes the Milwaukee Railroad packed trains
across the single road leading to the development. (68)
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Table 2
Deerfield - South Side Profit Per Square Foot
Comparison
Deerfield
(Broderick- Dart Home)*
South Side
(Reed Home)*
Cost per Square Foot $8. 34 $7. 95
$3. 99Gross Profit per Square Foot $2. 19
Ratio of Gross Profit to Cost 26% 50%
The Broderick-Dart Home and the Reed Home are similar models
both built by subsidiaries of Universal Builders, Inc.
Source Clark v. Universal Builders,"Official Transcript" p. 4447,
Exhibit 529.
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Table 3
Comparison of Mark-ups on Sales in Deerfield to Mark-ups on
Sales in Enalewood
Deerfield
Average Sales Price
Average Direct Cost 1
Average Gross Profit 2
Universal
Construction
$22, 644. 60
18, 779. 45
3, 865. 15
Deerfield
Homes *
$20, 585. 34
16, 953. 39
3, 631. 95
South Side
$25, 172. 53
18, 246. 14
6, 926. 39
Average
Profit to
ratio of Gross
Direct Costs -2 0. 58% 2 1. 42%
Direct costs -- land plus building costs
Gross profit -- total sales price minus total direct costs
Subsidiaries of Universal Builders, Inc.
Source : Clark v. Universal Builders, 'bfficial Transcript. " pp. 3077-80,
Exhibit 419.
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1
2
37. 96%
Table 4
Deerfield - South Side Net Profit Comparison
Deerfield
Average Net Profit*
Per Home
Ratio of Average
Net Profit to
Average Sales
Price
1957 1958 Both
Years
$2,267 $2, 498 $2,359
10.7% 11.8% 11.2%
South Side
1958 1959 Both
Years
$ 5, 081 $5, 659 $5, 450
20.8% 22.3% 21.7%
Net profit - - total sales price minus total direct costs and overhead,
which consists of officer's salaries, office expenses,
advertising, and miscellaneous expenses.
Source : Clark v. Universal Builders, "Official Transcript,"pp. 5172-80.
Exhibit 429.
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Under these adverse conditions it is understandable that profits
in Deerfield were low and that Universal Builders looked forward to
terminating its operations there and reviving the company on Chicago's
booming South Side. What the developers neglected to mention was the
size of their profits in relation to other land developers in Chicago's
white neighborhoods and even in Englewood. Surf Builders, a develop-
ment company selling homes to blacks in Englewood, for instance,
charged much lower prices than Universal Builders for very similar.
homes. This organization sold only 15 to 20 percent of its homes on
contract, while the remainder were financed with FHA or conventional
mortgages that became increasingly available to blacks during the 1960s.
Both Surf and Universal Builders operated in Englewood during this time,
but Universal insisted on financing homes with installment contracts. The
reason for this insistence can be seen in the profits made by the two
companies. According to an officer and shareholder in Surf Builders,
(69)
most of Surf's dwellings yielded a profit of 15 to 19 percent. This
was accepted by him as a reasonable profit of which Surf's shareholders
approved. In contrast, Universal Builders received an average profit of
38 percent. (70) Appraisers familiar with Chicago's residential real
estate market showed that this return was also greater than the profit
received for comparable housing in Chicago's white neighborhoods.
Despite all evidence to the contrary, contract sellers maintained
their attitude of misjudged benefactors condemned for serving an oppressed
race. As lawyers for the buyers stated, "even the worst of unethical
businessmen can claim that he dealt with his customers, even if unfairly.
This argument was the only defense for sellers who claimed that they
sold only to blacks in Chicago and never "entered into any arrangements
with whites to sell homes at prices lower or on terms more favorable than
charged the plaintiffs (black buyers). " (72) Sales in Deerfield were not
comparable they argued; sales in Chicago were irrelevant. Unless the
same seller sold to blacks and whites at different prices the defendants
declared that no racial discrimination occurred.
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C. Reaction of the Courts
At the outset of the case Judge Hubert Will, then presiding judge,
upheld the contract buyers' position. He stated:
Defendants present the discredited claim that
it is necessarily right for a businessman to
secure profit wherever profit is available,
arguing specifically with respect to this case that
they did not create the system of "de facto"
segregation which was the condition for the
alleged discriminatory profit. But the law in
the United States has grown to define certain
economic bounds and ethical limits of business
enterprise... So we are hearing an old and ob-
solete lament. For it is now understood that...
as interpreted in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.
there can not in this country be profits based on
the color of a man's skin. (73)
Unfortunately, Judge Will did not long remain on the case. Be-
lieving that very different circumstances were connected with the sale of
old homes on Chicago's West Side and new homes on the South Side, he
divided the original case into two cases, Clark versus Universal Builders
and Baker versus F and F Investment. Judge Will then decided not to
preside over either case. He explained that he would be charged by
buyers as favoring one group over the other, if having already given a
favorable opinion of the problem he accepted one case instead of the other.
In Clark versus Universal Builders Judge Sam Perry, the presiding
judge, did not share Judge Will's opinion of racially discriminatory pricing,
but fully upheld contract sellers' view that any profits are reasonable.
Judge Perry in effect over-ruled Judge Will's opinion that the contract
buyers had a legitimate complaint; and after hearing only the buyers'
side of the case, he gave a directed decision in favor of Universal Builders
and its subsidiaries.
Judge Perry held that no evidence of racial discrimination had been
presented. Taking a very narrow but traditional view of the civil rights
75
law, Judge Perry stated that "nowhere in the six weeks' trial is there one
scintilla of evidence that the defendants or any of their agents ever refused
to sell to a white person or a black or a non-white person any house or
refused to sell to one or the other at a higher or lower price. " (74) By
insisting that violations of the civil rights law occur only when one seller
refuses to sell to blacks at the same price charged by him to whites, Judge
Perry directly contradicted Judge Will who held that a developer selling
only to blacks but at prices above fair market value is guilty of racial
discrimination. Universal Builders and Judge Perry contended that if
property is sold to a black at a price demonstrated to be above the usual
market price, there can be no discrimination unless the same seller
actually sells to whites at a lower price. (75) This position had already
been contradicted by Judge Will, who said, "it should be clear that in law
this result would be obnoxious. In logic, it is ridiculous. It would mean
that the 1866 Civil Rights Act, which was created to be an instrument for
the abolution of discrimination, allows an injustice so long as it is visited
exclusively on Negroes." (76)
For Judge Perry this interpretation of the law was not obviously
correct, and throughout the trial he rejected all evidence supporting the
case of discriminatory pricing. Judge Perry did not accept the sales
prices of Deerfield homes as evidence. Holding that the suburban
community and Englewood were greatly affected by geographical location,
he concluded that the areas did not have comparable housing and that sales
made to whites in Deerfield, though lower than those to blacks in Chicago,
did not show discrimination.
Even Judge Perry acknowledged several times during the trial that
Universal Builders and associated land companies charged blacks prices
far above prices for comparable housing in the white submarket. As
he stated, "the counsel for the plaintiff's have not painted a pretty picture
of the defendants, but that picture is a picture of exploitation for profit;
S(78)
and not racial discrimination." For Judge Perry that profit was
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justified by contract sellers' risks of liability for millions of dollars on
outstanding mortgages held by financial institutions. Referring to
defaults by buyers and possible economic depressions as deterrents to
successful operation of Universal's business, Judge Perry said that
"so far, the profits are paper profits, and at an extreme depression they
(Universal and its subsidiaries) could face bankruptcy. " That many
contract buyers were already having financial difficulties because of
inflated housing prices was not mentioned; and Universal Builders was
hailed for taking the risk of failure common to any business regardless
of its profit margin.
Not content to merely confirm the right of businessmen to make
profits, Judge Perry went a step further and attempted to preclude
challenges to their rights. As he stated, "there has never been another
case, except for the other pending companion case (Baker versus F and F
Investment), founded upon the theory that this case is founded upon. It
is a completely new theory, and it is untested, and now is the time to
threhol. ,(80)dispose of it at the threshold. " He disposed of it by violating the
contract buyers' rights to seek judicial redress. During the trial the
defendants filed a counterclaim against the buyers charging that certain
buyers made defamatory statements about the sellers, interfered with
court orders by preventing evictions, interrupted the course of business
activity with payment strikes, and destroyed the seller's property in acts
of arson. After giving a directed decision, Judge Perry stipulated that
this counterclaim would be dismissed only if the buyers did not appeal
the decision. Another condition was made by the judge. Perry stated:
I am taking the matter of apportioning costs
under advisement. If there is no appeal, I
expect to order each of the parties to bear their
own respective costs. If there is an appeal, I
will enter the order as I see fit, in accordance
with the law. (81)
When contract buyers and their lawyers defied Judge Perry and
appealed the case, he required that they post a bond of $25, 000. The
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contract buyers were, however, determined to continue the fight. One more
cost, one more delay in the administering of justice did not thwart their
efforts.
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CONCLUSION
The Contract Buyers League is nearly defunct. The thousands
of buyers represented as plaintiffs in two Federal Court cases, the
hundreds of members that regularly attended CBL meetings, the many
families that participated in the payment strike, and the 150 buyers who
faced eviction from their homes no longer actively oppose the misuse of
land installment contracts. Only Charles Baker and Clyde Ross, former
leaders of CBL, along with part-time workers remain in the Lawndale
office, once the center of the League's activities. Recently begun projects
to rehabilitate two city blocks of West Side neighborhoods have recieved
support from some League members who again actively participate in
the organization. But, unlike the community improvement programs so
successful in 1968, the recent projects involve few residents. Of course,
other community organizations have grown up on both the South and West
Sides, but the groups are distinct from the Contract Buyers League. Yet,
attempts to renegotiate contracts slowly continue. Far from Lawndale or
Englewood in the heart of Chicago's commercial district Jack Macnamara
and several Gamaliel employees telephone realtors, talk to bankers, and
occasionally advise a contract buyer, as the process of renegotiating
contracts is carried on out of court.
As hopes for change waned, activities by the contract buyers
decreased, and solutions to most of the issues around which the League
emerged were sought in court. In the name of the buyers several lawyers
provided without cost by Chicago law firms continue to challenge the
misuse of land installment contracts, but their efforts have thus far
brought no direct remuneration for black buyers. Some achievements
have been made through the legal system. No longer may land contracts
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contain clauses forbidding their recordation; contract buyers now have
the right to state why they are not making payments before they can be
evicted; and appeal bonds need not be posted before a buyer can contest
an eviction decision. Attempts to force contract renegotiations and obtain
reimbursements for over-charges have not been as successful. Although
an appeal is now being requested, one Federal case, Clark versus
Universal Builders, has been lost, and the pending case, Baker versus
F and F Investment, will probably not be won.
The issue of discriminatory pricing remains a sensitive one. Some
supporters like Judge Hubert Will uphold the black consumers! position,
yet others resist efforts to modify the businessman's present rights .
With many judges like Perry it may take many acts of protest to gain
acknowledgement of discriminatory pricing and inequitable land contract
terms. Only after several more years of lawsuits and appeals can the
Contract Buyers League hope to obtain relief through the legal system.
It is unlikely that either the South or West Side cases will be decided
favorably for Chicago's black contract buyers in the next few years.
In the meantime contract buyers must continue to make payments
on poor quality homes for many of which the fair market value was long
ago paid and over-charges are now required. What then have members of
the Contract Buyers League gained from their efforts? Several tangible
benefits are evident. With the aid of CBL about 150 families in Lawndale
have renegotiated their contracts out of court decreasing their total cost
of housing by approximately $1, 750, 000, (82) eliminating oppressive
contract terms, and securing a deed and full control over their properties.
Financial institutions have made mortgage funds available for predomi-
nantly black neighborhoods, thus reducing black buyers' reliance on land
installment contracts; and reputable insurance companies have started
to serve both Lawndale and Englewood.
As a political organization the Contract Buyers League's influence
on the black community was short lived. Because all efforts were devoted
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to renegotiating land contracts, a goal that soon was undertaken through
the legal system, the group had few issues around which to organize.
As the buyers' role in the organization became that of a legal class
demanding judicial reparation, satisfied buyers with renegotiated con-
tracts, or discontented consumers seeking new homes and opportunities
with the cash they withheld during payment strikes, they lost their en-
thusiasm for the organization. Few chances for continued work with CBL
existed. Even field work for the lawsuits was not handled by blacks.
Instead, Jack Macnamara and the Gamaliel Foundation hired white
students to conduct surveys and gather information on land contracts for
the Federal cases. Despite Charles Baker's and Clyde Ross' present
attempts to reorganize Lawndale members around housing rehabilitation
and other neighborhood programs, the League is no longer a viable organ-
ization. Yet the group did contribute to the black community's sense of
cohesion for at least a short time and proved the community's ability to
gather public support and initiate change.
That the Contract Buyers League could have used much more
effective means to reform land installment contracts is unlikely. Discus-
sions, pickets and payment strikes had only a limited usefulness before
buyers had to resort to legal action or otherwise impose the hardship of
evictions and financial losses on League members. Alternative methods
of reforming contracts were then defined within a legal framework.
Now that two lawsuits in Federal Court are underway, lawyers and
leaders of the contract buyers question the course legal action should
have taken. Some lawyers believe that the payment strikes should have
been continued and all efforts devoted to trying hundreds of eviction cases
in the Illinois State Court. Once the precedence of preventing evictions
and rescinding or changing land contracts was set in court for a few cases,
these lawyers contend that all eviction cases against contract buyers
would have been won; and land contracts with excessive sales prices or
unreasonable terms would no longer have been considered legally binding.
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The merits of this approach to renegotiating contracts for Chicago's
black buyers is doubtful. As yet no decision has been made about the
legality of land contracts in the single eviction case that buyers appealed.
Like the Federal Court cases, the State Court case of Rosewood
Corporation versus Fisher will probably continue for some time before
the land contract that Chester Fisher signed is declared reasonable or
illegal. If lawyers had pursued this process for each of more than 3500
buyers, the courts and the Contract Buyers League would have been in
constant upheaval probably without effecting change.
The implications of the Contract Buyers League's activities
transcend the few contract renegotiations made in Chicago. Because
Chicago's contract buyers protested the misuse of land installment con-
tracts, contract buyers around the nation benefited. First of all, the
League's activities led to protests by other groups of buyers. Inspired
by the League's success in revising at least some land contracts and
mobilizing public support for further change, several organizations
developed in Baltimore and other major cities. If Chicago's contract
buyers eventually win the lawsuits, a new judicial attitude regulating land
contracts may save millions of dollars for consumers now over-charged.
Legislative regulation of land installment contracts may also
result from black buyers' protest. The Contract Buyers League did not
concentrate on this method of changing land contracts because statutory
laws cannot be applied retroactively and would not require renegotiation
of existing contracts. Because of protests by a group of South Side buyers
in 1966 and later by CBL, however, the Chicago Bar Association became
aware of how badly the financing mechanism is used, and is now sponsoring
a bill in the Illinois State Legislature. If adopted the Consumer Real
Estate Protection Act will make land contracts a useful means of
financing real estate.
Land installment contracts need not be insidious. With a few
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reforms they can be used more easily than traditional mortgages to
extend credit to the low-income consumer and protect sellers against
the risk of buyers' defaults. The most necessary change is to increase
the buyer's control over his property as his investment increases.
Sellers now hold the deed and control over the property until the final
payment is made. If instead a deed is conveyed to the purchaser after
one half of the principle is paid, the seller will retain control only until
the buyer's reliability as a good credit risk is established and the seller's
investment is no longer threatened.
Two aspects of land contracts have locked buyers into housing that
no longer meets their needs, and have trapped many low- income consumers
in declining neighborhoods. These constraints on the buyer's mobility
are caused by the purchaser's inability to sell his interests without the
seller's permission and the forfeiture of all payments as liquidated /
damages upon default. The first problem is eliminated when the deed is
transferred. If damages are limited to 25 percent of the principle and
the seller is required to refund all other payments exclusive of interest,
the buyer is not forced to continue a bad investment; and the dishonest
speculator is discouraged from entering the market to fleece and then
evict purchasers. Other changes necessary to protect purchasers include
controlling the interest rate, certifying the absence of building code
violations, proving the seller's clear title to the property, and stating the
seller's purchase price of a dwelling if it was acquired within two years
of the contract sale.
More than changes in the use of land contracts may result because
of black Chicagoans' protest, for the issue of economic discrimination
was raised by contract buyers' legal action. Couched in terms of racial
discrimination, the League's demand was for new regulations in the
market system allowing greater protection for an economically disadvan-
taged class. In the case of the black housing purchasers, an artificially
restricted housing supply created by racial discrimination caused
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this economic disadvantage. Realizing that Federal District Court judges
would be unwilling to alter America's economic system by increasing
the low-income consumer's buying power, lawyers for the contract
buyers did not emphasize that land contracts as now used are oppressive
for both black and low-income housing consumers. Yet, all low-income
consumers are affected by housing scarcity. Like black housing purchasers
in Lawndale, they are caught in a restricted market where prices are high
because few sellers wish to risk operating there; and the risk is increased
because consumers pay unusually large amounts for goods the prices of
which are increased by a premium to offset the seller's risk.
Even if the terms of land installment contracts were changed to
protect the low-income consumer, this means of financing residential
real estate can not alone destroy the market conditions that cause low-
income consumers to pay high prices for low quality housing. Unless the
stigma of risk is removed from selling homes to low-income buyers, home
ownership for this group will always be extremely costly. The Federal
Housing Administration has utilized various programs to stimulate the
housing market for middle- income consumers by insuring lending institu-
tions against losses. A similar program to alleviate the scarcity of
credit and housing for low-income people is necessary too, for lenders
and sellers are unwilling to accept the risks of selling to these consumers
at normal market prices. As existing FHA loan-guarantee programs are
terminated, the likelihood of obtaining Federal guarantees for low-income
housing diminishes. Until alternative financing mechanisms are created,
consumers like Chicago's black contract buyers will probably continue to
use land installment contracts, not a pleasant prospect unless the contract
terms are changed.
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